Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions by Oddi, A. Samuel
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 1 Article 7
6-1-1999
Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort
and Technological Tensions
A. Samuel Oddi
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
A. S. Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 47 (1989).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol64/iss1/7
Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort
and Technological Tensions
A. Samuel Oddi*
I. The Tort of Contributory Infringement ..................... 51
A. Intellectual Property and Tort Theory .................. 51
B. The Betamax Approach-Majority and Minority .......... 54
II. Scope of Contributory Infringement ........................ 58
A. Standard for Direct Infringement ....................... 58
B. Contributing Conduct and Fault ........................ 64
C. Misuse of Intellectual Property ......................... 78
D, Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine ................... 84
E. Duty Owed to Intellectual Property Owners ............. 86
III. T ensions ................................................... 90
IV. Conclusion ................................................. 103
By far the most controversial of the Supreme Court's "trilogy" of
cases' dealing with the tort of contributory infringement 2 of intellectual
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
1 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Inwood Laboratories v.
Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176
(1980). In Dawson, the Court considered contributory patent infringement. For references analyz-
ing contributory patent infringement and the Dawson case, see 4 D. CHisuM, PATENTS § 17.02[8]
(1988); Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV.
73 (1982) [hereinafter CPI]; Oddi, Contributory Infringement in the United States: Theory, Application, Devel-
opments (pts. I & 2), 20 INDUS. PROP. 177 (1981) [hereinafter CPI/US]; Oddi, La contrefacon indirecte
aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique: theorie application et evolution (pts. 1 & 2), 97 LA PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 190
(1981).
In the Ives case, the Court considered contributory trademark infringement. For references ana-
lyzing contributory trademark infringement and the Ives case, see 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:2 (2d ed. 1984); Oddi, Product Simulation and Contributory Trademark Infringe-
ment: A Right Suggests a Wrong, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 601 (1983) [hereinafter CTI]; Germain, The Supreme
Court's Opinion in the Inwood Case: Declination of Duty, 70 KY. LJ. 731 (1982); Kranzow, McCarthy,
Palladino, Pattishall & Swann, Analysis of the Ives Case: A TMR Panel, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1982);
Palladino, Trademarks and Competition: The Ives Case, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 319 (1982); Weinberg,
Drug Capsule Copying in the Wake of Ives: A Comment on Two Decisions, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 285 (1982).
2 The term contributory infringement is used throughout this article in a generic sense to in-
clude all forms of "contributory" conduct for which liability may be imposed on a party who does
not "directly" infringe the intellectual property in question by personally performing all the acts
necessary to constitute direct infringement. Conduct that may be more appropriately defined as
inducement of infringement has been commonly referred to as contributory infringement. See, e.g.,
the Ives case, 456 U.S. at 850-54. In an attempt to avoid any ambiguity, contributory infringement
and inducing infringement will be so identified whenever such a distinction appears warranted. The
Patent Act of 1952, as amended, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), separately defines
contributory patent infringement in § 27 1(c) and inducement of patent infringement in § 271(b).
Neither the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986), nor the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) specifically refer to either contributory or induced infringement, although the Lanham Act
covers a specific type of contributory trademark infringement relating to the reproduction of a trade-
mark (e.g., on labels or wrappers) for use on goods in commerce. Trademark Act of 1946, as
amended, § 32(1)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(b) (1982).
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property3 has been Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios4 (Betamax
case). The Court, by a five-to-four majority, held that it was not contrib-
utory infringement of the Studios' 5 copyrights for Sony to sell its
Betamax type of video cassette recorder (VCR)6 to consumers who used
them to record copyrighted works off-the-air.7 The Court concluded that
3 The term intellectual property is used in this article in reference to patents, trademarks and
copyrights. There are, of course, various types of patents and marks as well as other forms of intel-
lectual property. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (utility patents); id. § 171 (design patents); iat
§ 161 (plant patents); 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982) (trademarks); id. § 1053 (service marks); id. § 1054
(collective and certification marks). The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization, signed at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, defines intellectual property as follows:
- literary, artistic and scientific works,
- performances of performing artists, phonogram, and broadcasts,
- inventions in all fields of human endeavor,
- scientific discoveries,
- industrial designs,
- trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations,
- protection against unfair competition, and all other rights resulting from intellectual
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, art. 2 (viii), 21
U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932.
4 464 U.S. 417 (1984). For references analyzing contributory copyright infringement and the
Betamax case, see 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (1988); Conley, Copyright and Contrib-
utory Infringement, 23 IDEA 185 (1983); CTI, supra note 1, at 616-19; Comment, Contributory Infringe-
ment by Providing the Means: The Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine and an Alternative Analysis for Copyright
Law, 18J. MARSHALL L. REV. 703 (1985); Note, Contributory Infringement Liability in Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., v. Sony Corp.: "The One and Only" Prays for Our Sins, 14 Loy. U. Cm. LJ. 79 (1982); see also
Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other than for Profit or Sale Constitute
Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. Louis U.LJ. 647
(1984); Gordan, Fair Use or Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Sinclair, Fair Use Old and New: The Betamax Case and its
Forebears, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 269 (1984).
With reference to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am.,
659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), one commentator went so far as to say: "In
the long history ofits offenses, thejudiciary-that much maligned branch of government-had prob-
ably never issued a decision that attracted more abuse and less sympathy." Lardner, Annals of Lan-
The Betamax Case-I, NEW YORKER, Apr. 6, 1987, at 45, 71 [hereinafter Lardner I]. See also Lardner,
Annals of Law-The Betamax Case-l, NEw YORKER Apr. 15, 1987, at 61 [hereinafter Lardner II].
5 Universal City Studios was joined by Walt Disney Productions in bringing the contributory
infringement action against Sony; however, the prime mover in the litigation was Universal. See
Lardner I, supra note 4, at 50. Mr. Lardner provides a fascinating report of this litigation including
the events leading up to it, the economic and legal strategies involved, its aftermath, and the person-
alities of the various individuals involved. Of particular background interest is the fact that Music
Corporation of America (M.C.A.), the parent company of Universal City Studios, had invested mil-
lions of dollars in a videodisc playback only system, called "Disco Vision," which used a laser beam
to decipher an audio/visual work recorded on a vinyl disc that was played-back via a television set.
In September of 1976, prior to filing the Betamax suit, M.C.A. had been negotiating with Sony to
manufacture its videodisc players. Indeed, Sidney Sheinberg, president of M.C.A., and Len Wasser-
man, Chairman of M.C.A., while negotiating with respect to the manufacture of "DiscoVision," ad-
vised Akio Morita, Chairman of Sony, that unless the Betamax was taken from the market, M.C.A.
would be forced to sue Sony. Illustrative perhaps of the different styles of conducting business,
Lardner reports Morita's response as follows:
Morita told Wasserman and Sheinberg that he found it hard to understand how they
could discuss a business deal and threaten a lawsuit at the same time. It was his policy and
Japanese tradition, he said, that "when we shake hands we will not hit you with the other
hand."
Id. at 47. Lardner reports that by the end of 1981, M.C.A. had lost a total of approximately $30
million in its development of its videodisc system. Id. at 70.
6 In the Betamax opinion "VTR" is used to indicate a "video tape recorder." This latter term
has generally now been replaced with "video cassette recorder." Accordingly, in this article "VCR"
will be used to indicate a video recorder whether in "Beta" or "VHS" versions.
7 464 U.S. at 456.
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such recording by consumers was permissible "fair use," because the
VCRs were "widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes,"
namely, "private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home,"8 and hence
did not constitute direct infringement of the Studios' copyrights. Absent
such direct infringement, there could be no contributory infringement by
Sony.9
The Betamax decision may be characterized as a victory for the VCR
industry and their users10 in eliminating the broad-based employment of
contributory infringement. Nonetheless, Betamax, in the long run, may
be viewed as a mere failure on the part of the copyright owners to prove
substantial direct infringement."'
While there is no question that copy technology creates significant
worries for copyright owners, there is no inherent tension between copy-
right and technology.' 2 More often than not technology is sympathetic
and complementary rather than antagonistic and antithetical to copy-
right.1 3 Copyright owners, however, clearly understand that copy tech-
nology is technically indifferent to their copyrighted works; indeed, a
significant part of such copy technology's value may reside in this
indifference. 14
8 Id. at 442. Lardner attributes Sony's Chairman Morita with having coined the term "time-
shifting." Lardner I, supra note 4, at 55.
9 The sine qua non of direct infringement is contributory infringement: "In-a word, if there is
no [direct] infringement of a patent there can be no contributory infringer." Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting on other grounds), quoted in
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972).
10 See Lardner II, supra note 4, at 75-81, for a discussion of the lobbying efforts undertaken after
the Betamax decision.
11 This is in view of the majority's equivocation on applying a technical capability standard and
the minority's position that the scope of protection offered to copyright owners should depend on
the extent to which consumers used their VCR's "fairly" or "unfairly." For further elaboration, see
infra text accompanying notes 60-73.
12 In this article, "technology" is used in the general sense to include both patentable and un-
patentable inventions. Incentives for the creation of such inventions are provided by the federal
patent system and state trade secret protection. See infra note 17 and text accompanying notes 17
and 338-39.
13 The copyright statute, however, lags behind the development of new media for fixing copy-
righted works. The Copyright Acts have been repeatedly amended over the past two hundred years
to define new copyrightable subject matter. This history is summarized by Professor Goldstein:
The first federal copyright law, the Act of May 31, 1790, was also closely patterned after the
English Statute. The Act's original subject matter, charts and books, was gradually ex-
panded as new economic interests and technologies pressed for recognition. Prints were
added in the Act of 1802, musical compositions in the Act of 1831, photographs and nega-
tives in the Act of 1865, paintings, drawings, chromos, and statuary in the Act of 1870, and
motion pictures in the Act of 1912, the last expansion of coverage until sound recordings
were added in 1971.
P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 652 (2d ed. 1981).
See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 460-61 (1984). The Copyright
Act of 1976 was amended in 1980 to include a definition of "computer program." 17 U.S.C. § 101,
amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3014. Computer programs have
been held to fall within the "literary works" category of copyrightable subject matter. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(c)(1) (1982). See infra note 279.
14 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without
opinion, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (where the National Library of Medicine and the National Institute of
Health photocopied over 200,000 separate articles from plaintiff's copyrighted journals rather than
purchasing additional copies of the journals. Liability was denied on the ground of fair use.).
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Consequently tension is created between copyright owners whose
works are easily copied and technology owners whose equipment permits
such copying. The availability of a contributory infringement action may
provide copyright owners with a potent weapon to enforce their copy-
rights against unauthorized copying by owners of copy equipment within
their own homes or offices.15 Indiscriminately broad application of the
doctrine, however, would exacerbate tensions between copyright and
technology. A more productive approach would examine the underlying
policies and tort principles supporting the doctrine. Proposed legislative
solutions 16 also miss the mark by creating conflict between the develop-
ment of patentable and copyrightable subject matter.1 7
This article examines the tort of contributory copyright infringe-
ment along with its underlying tensions. Part I examines the general tort
theory underlying contributory copyright infringement and its applica-
tion to copyright law as evidenced by Betamax.18 Part II identifies various
factors that bear upon the scope of contributory copyright infringement
with reference to their relevance in the Betamax case. Part III examines
the tensions between copyright owners and developers of copy technol-
ogy. Additionally, Part III addresses the public interest in having access
to both copyrighted works and copy technology. Finally, Part IV ex-
plores solutions to these tensions in light of the constitutional mandates
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science [as embodied in copyrightable
works] and useful Arts [as embodied in patentable inventions]."' 19
15 Otherwise, as a practical matter, it would be impossible for copyright owners to protect
against individual consumers using copy technology to the extent of direct infringement within the
privacy of their homes or offices. One of the principal rationales for the doctrine of contributory
infringement is to avoid the difficulty of suing individual direct infringers. See Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1980) (discussing Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100)).
16 See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text discussing a federal statute that would require
that the latest development in audio recording equipment include a "jamming" device that would
render the recorder incapable of recording appropriately encoded copyrighted works.
17 The incentive to create certain types of technology is lessened to increase the incentive for the
creation of certain types of copyrighted works. A serious question arises whether such a proposal is
fully compatible with the dual goals of the patent/copyright clause of the Constitution empowering
Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Written in a style typical of the late nineteenth century, this clause may be
dissected into two parallel subclauses, with "Science," "Authors," and "Writings" referring to copy-
rights ("Science" at that time meaning "knowledge" in general) and with "useful Arts," "Inven-
tors," and "Discoveries" referring to patents. See 1 E. LipscoMB, WALKER ON PATENTS § 2:1 (3d ed.
1984); see also Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109
(1928-1929).
The statute may also reduce the incentives to create even unpatentable technology, which the
tort of misappropriation of trade secrets traditionally protected. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
(1939). In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized
that both the federal patent system and the state protection of trade secrets could provide incentives
to invent: "Certainly the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of
another form of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems are not and never would be in
conflict." Id. at 484.
18 464 U.S. 417 (1984). This article will identify instances where the doctrine of contributory
infringement diverges from general tort theory and where different rules are applied among the
respective titles of intellectual property, and will attempt to indicate any policy reasons that might
justify such differences in application.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
[Vol. 64:47
1989] CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 5i
I. The Tort of Contributory Infringement
Writing for the majority in the Betamax case, Justice Stevens agreed
with the observation of the district court that " 'the lines between direct
infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not
clearly drawn .... ,'20 Justice Stevens partially attributed the lack of
clarity to "the fact that an infringer is not merely one who uses a work
without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who autho-
rizes the use of the copyrighted work without actual authority from the
copyright owner."' 21 A more plausible reason for the confusion is the
failure to consider the underlying tort theory justifying the imposition of
liability (especially if injunctive relief is sought) upon those having some
causal relationship with the ultimate infringement of a copyrighted work.
Clarity, however, does not seem to be significantly advanced by Justice
Stevens' far-reaching generalization: "For vicarious liability is imposed
in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringe-
ment is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the cir-
cumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the
actions of another." 22 One would expect that the "circumstances in
which it is just" would comport with general tort theory for imposing
liability on persons contributing to the harm, unless particular policy rea-
sons justify deviation from the general tort rules when intellectual prop-
erty is involved. Indeed, one would expect a certain degree of
consistency among the principal titles of intellectual property (patents,
trademarks, copyrights), unless again the nature of the respective titles of
protection justifies a different treatment.23
A. Intellectual Property and Tort Theory
The theory underlying contributory infringement parallels that of
trespass upon a property interest. Federal law defines or treats intellec-
tual property in the form of patents,24 copyrights 25 and trademarks, in a
20 464 U.S. at 435 n.17 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. 429,
457-58 (C.D. Cal. 1979)).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 435.
23 Different statutory provisions would be the most obvious reason for variance. For example,
the Patent Act of 1952, as amended, defines induced infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1982), and
contributory infringement, id. § 271(c), while the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, does not. In
addition, history has played a role in how the theories have developed. The doctrine of patent mis-
use has significantly limited induced and contributory infringement in patent law. See infra text ac-
companying notes 207-33.
24 "Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property."
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982). Note, however, the whole "bundle of sticks" is not granted to the patentee,
who receives only the "right to exclude others from making, using, or s~lling the invention." Id.
§ 154. In particular, the patentee does not acquire the right to use the patented invention; indeed,
the patent of another may bar its use.
25 While not specifically defining a copyright as property, the Copyright Act of 1976, as
amended, refers throughout to the ownership of a copyright and states with respect to the transfer of
ownership that a copyright "may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by applicable
laws of intestate succession." 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1982). The exclusive rights granted to a copy-
right owner are:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work;
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more qualified sense,26 as intangible personal property; thus infringe-
ment constitutes a trespass tort. 27 Direct infringement comprises com-
pletion of all the acts necessary to constitute infringement by a single
party. 28 Liability for direct infringement is imposed on a strict liability
basis. 29 Such direct infringement of a property interest results naturally
in property solutions being sought to redress the trespass, which nor-
mally would involve an injunction to bar the trespass from continuing.30
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id. § 106
26 The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), as amended, does not define a trademark as prop-
erty; however, by registration under the Act:
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by this chapter
shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, registrant's ownership of the
mark, and of registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the
goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions and limitations stated
therein.
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), as amended, § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1982). The United
States Supreme Court in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), considered a trademark to be
property but held that trademarks did not qualify as "writings" or "discoveries" which would au-
thorize Congress to legislate with regard thereto on the basis of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also
CTI, supra note 1, at 608-09.
27 E.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897): "An
infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the case." As stated by Justice
Stevens in Betamax: "[A]nyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the
use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, 'is an infringer of the
copyright.'" Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
28 The Patent Act of 1952, as amended, defines direct patent infringement as follows: "Except
as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented in-
vention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), as amended, provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive ....
15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) (1982).
The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, provides: "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118, or who imports copies or
phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright." 17
U.S.C. § 501 (a) (1982). See supra note 25 (listing the "exclusive rights of section 106).
29 With regard to patents, in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476
(1964) (Aro II), the Court stated with respect to direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a): "Not
only does that provision [section 271 (a)] explicitly regard an unauthorized user of a patented inven-
tion as an infringer, but it has often and clearly been held that unauthorized use, without more,
constitutes infringement [citing Supreme Court cases]." Id. at 484 (citations omitted). For the text
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982), seesupra note 28. With regard to trademarks, see Saxlehner v. Siegel-
Cooper Co., 179 U.S. 42, 43 (1900). See also Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), as amended,
§ 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1982), quoted supra note 28; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§§ 22:30, 23:3 1n; Pattishall, The Impact of Intent on Trade Identity Cases, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 421 (1970).
With regard to copyrights, users of VCR's would be the direct infringers in Betamax; see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(a) (1982), quoted supra note 28; 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13-08.
30 The intellectual property statutes expressly provide for injunctive relief against infringement.
See Patent Act of 1952, as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1982); Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act),
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Contributory infringement involves conduct by a party other than
the direct infringer, where such conduct itself falls somewhat short of
being direct infringement.3 1 There must, however, be a causal relation-
ship between the direct infringement and the conduct of the contributory
infringer.32 Depending upon how one defines contributory infringe-
ment, the scope of the underlying property right in the intellectual prop-
erty may be expanded or contracted accordingly.3 3 Moreover, as
contributory infringement also involves a trespass tort, one would expect
property solutions, particularly injunctive relief.34
Contributory infringement principally imposes liability on two un-
derlying tort theories: 1) for engaging in concerted35 conduct resulting
in direct infringement; 2) for inducing3 6 someone else to commit direct
infringement. Of particular importance is the extension in intellectual
property of the concerted conduct theory to include "implied concerted"
conduct based upon the sale of an article of a particular nature that is
ultimately used in direct infringement.3 7
Five identifiable factors define the scope of protection afforded
under the doctrine of contributory infringement. These factors are
either inherent or have been judicially or legislatively engrafted on this
tort. These factors which bear upon the scope of contributory infringe-
ment are as follows: 1) the standard for direct infringement, because a
holding of direct infringement is an essential element in the tort of con-
tributory infringement;38 2) the type of contributory conduct and the
necessary fault standard with respect to such conduct; 39 3) whether the
owner of the intellectual property has "misused" it so as to extend the
monopoly granted beyond the scope of the grant;40 4) the nature of the
as amended, § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (Supp. IV 1986); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 502
(1982). Such injunctions may have nationwide effect.
31 As stated by Justice Holmes in reference to an unauthorized production of a motion picture
(Ben Hur): "If the defendant did not 'ontribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so except
by taking part in the final act." Kalem Co. v. Harder Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911). In Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), Justice Blackmun stated: "[Contributory
infringement] exists to protect patent rights from subversion by those who, without directly infring-
ing the patent themselves, engage in acts designed to facilitate infringement by others." Id. at 188.
32 This is a requirement for holding one liable for the tort of another unless based on vicarious
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979), quoted infra note 252. In the Betamax
case Justice Blackmun implied the causal relationship between the seller of VCR's and their users:
"In a case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly: it does not depend on evidence
that particular Betamax owners relied on particular advertisements." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 489 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33 See infra Part II (discussing the factors that bear upon the scope of contributory infringement).
34 In Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) an injunction was obtained
against the sale of an unpatented chemical; in the trademark case, Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Labo-
ratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982), an injunction was denied against the sale of look-a-like capsules con-
taining an unpaiented chemical because of the failure to prove "suggestion" by significant infringing
use of the trademark.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 133-41 for a discussion of the concerted conduct theory of
liability.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 180-206 for a discussion of the inducement theory of
liability.
37 See infra text accompanying notes 142-79 for a discussion of the implied concerted conduct
theory of liability.
38 See infra text accompanying notes 80-128.
39 See infra text accompanying notes 129-206.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 207-39.
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article being sold for use in direct infringement-the "staple article of
commerce doctrine; '41 and 5) whether the accused contributory in-
fringer has a duty to the owner of intellectual property. 42 These factors
sometimes overlap and tend to become interdependent in defining the
scope of protection that a court is willing to grant to an intellectual prop-
erty owner.43
An overview of the respective approaches taken by the majority and
minority on the question of contributory copyright infringement in the
Betamax decision will be given here to set the stage for its critique in view
of the five factors identified.
B. The Betamax Approach-Majority and Minority
The Betamax majority44 agreed with the district court that Sony had
not induced infringement by users of its VCR's because, in essence, there
were no personal contacts with such users, directly or indirectly, by the
means of its advertisements to encourage such infringement. 45 So find-
ing, the majority posited that "[i]f vicarious liability is to be imposed
upon Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment
with constructive knowledge that its customers may use this equip-
ment" 46 to directly infringe copyrights. Finding no precedent for such a
theory of liability in copyright law, the majority turned to patent law be-
cause of the "historic kinship between patent law and copyright law."
47
The majority presented less-than-overwhelming evidence in support of
this "historic kinship," citing dicta from a few Supreme Court decisions
to illustrate the "kinship," while citing dicta from other cases cautioning
against unreasoned transfer from one to the other.48
41 See infra text accompanying notes 240-49.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 250-72.
43 For example, whether or not contributory infringement exists may depend upon the charac-
terization of the product being sold as a staple or a nonstaple and may also define the line between
misuse and permissible conduct on the part of the intellectual property owner. See infra text accom-
panying notes 240-44.
44 Justice Stevens, joined by ChiefJustice Burger, and Justices Brennan, White and O'Connor.
45 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984).
46 Id. at 439.
47 Id.
48 The court cited three cases in support of this "kinship": (1) United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-58 (1948) (an antitrust case analogizing copyright law to patent law
with regard to tie-ins, i.e. conditioning the right to perform one copyrighted work on taking other
works); (2) Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932) (holding that patents and copyrights
should be treated the same with respect to the permissibility of a state's taxing royalties on copy-
rights); (3) Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657-58 (1834) (recognizing the statutory basis
for the grant of copyrights and patents). In cautioning against treating patents and copyrights iden-
tically, the Court cited two cases: (1) Mazor v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (indicating the differ-
ence in protection afforded under copyrights and patents: "[T]he copyright protects originality
rather than novelty or invention-conferring only 'the sole right of multiplying copies.' ") (footnote
omitted); and (2) Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 345, 351 (1908) (recognizing "that
there are differences between the patent and copyright statute in the extent of protection guaranteed
by them," but holding that the copyright statute did not authorize the copyright owner to condition
a license under the copyrighted work on resale at a minimum price.). Cf Heaton-Peninsular Button-
Fastener Co. v. Eureka Speciality Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (holding that a patent owner could




The Betamax majority recognized the dangers of predicating contrib-
utory infringement on the sale of an article of commerce as implicating
the public interest and concluded: "Indeed, a finding of contributory
infringement is normally the functional equivalent of holding that the
disputed article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. ' 49 In
elaborating on this point in a footnote the court stated: "It seems ex-
traordinary that the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright owners col-
lectively, much less the two respondents in this case, the exclusive right
to distribute VTR's simply because they may be used to infringe copy-
rights." 50 The majority accordingly adopted the "staple article of com-
merce doctrine" from patent law, and posited that this doctrine "must
strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for ef-
fective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and
the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce."51
The majority then formulated in the negative, the standard for con-
tributory infringement in three different ways. There is no contributory
infringement: (1) "if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjec-
tionable purposes; ' 52 (2) if the product is "merely ... capable of substantial
noninfringing uses;" s53 and (3) if the product is "capable of commercially sig-
nificant noninfringing uses."'54 Presumably, the Court was announcing
the same standard in its three formulations; one would expect that
"widely," "substantial" and "commercially significant" might have the
same meaning in establishing the quantity of noninfringing uses. On the
other hand, one may not expect the same qualitative standard to be ex-
pressed in each of these three formulations. It is unclear, however,
whether the majority adopted a technical capability standard or a user
capability standard. A technical capability standard would inquire
whether a VCR is capable of recording noncopyrighted works off-the-air
as well as copyrighted ones, while a user capability standard would ex-
amine the subjective motivations of the individual users of VCR's.
Rather than simply holding that VCR's were obviously technically
capable of noninfringing uses, the majority reasoned that it "need not
explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine
whether or not they would constitute infringement," 55 nor did it need to
"give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially sig-
49 464 U.S. at 441.
50 Id. at 442. That copyright owners should have such an "extraordinary" right was expressed
by Sidney Sheinberg, the President of Universal Pictures and M.C.A., as early as 1976, when
Betamaxes had just started to be marketed:
The issue is: Should Sony be able to sell this product? We're crazy to let them. All we do is
sell somebody the right to see the privilege of seeing-a motion picture or a television
program. This machine was made and marketed to copy copyrighted material. It's a copy-
right violation. It's got to be.
Lardner I, supra note 4, at 45.
51 464 at 442. See infra notes 240-49 and accompanying text discussing the "staple article of
commerce doctrine."
52 Id. (emphasis added).
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 Id (emphasis added).
55 Id. (emphasis in original).
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nificant.' ' 56 The majority then concluded that "private, noncommercial
time-shifting in the home"5 7 is one potential use for the Betamax that
would satisfy this standard. The majority then undertook a fair use anal-
ysis 58 and concluded that the copying within the home for time-shifting is
permissible under the fair use doctrine. Thus, because of fair use by
users, there was substantial noninfringing use, i.e., insubstantial direct
infringement by Betamax owners, and accordingly Sony was not a con-
tributory infringer.59
The minority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun,6 0 argued that
user capability controlled and proof of the quantum of direct infringe-
ment should constitute the standard for contributory infringement. On
the question of inducing infringement, Justice Blackmun reasoned that
causation need not be shown directly but could be shown indirectly, even
in the absence of evidence that certain Betamax owners relied on particu-
lar Sony advertisements. 61 The dissent argued that the gap in direct cau-
sation could be implied from the nature of the article being sold, the
Betamax. With this implication, the dissent would apply the trademark
standard for contributory infringement adopted by the Court in Inwood
Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories 62 to inquire whether Sony "suggested, even
by implication," that its purchasers use the Betamax to infringe copy-
righted works. 63
To satisfy the "suggestion" standard, the dissent asserted that
"[o]ff-the-air recording is not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but
indeed is its intended use."' 64 However, the minority then seemingly
combined two theories of contributory infringement based upon the sale
of VCR's: "Sony has induced and materially contributed to the infringing
conduct of Betamax owners." ' 65 By eliminating the requirement of a per-
sonal nexus between seller and buyer and then bridging the causation
gap by jumping from foreseeability of use to intended use, the minority
effectively proposed a negligence standard: Because Sony should have
56 Id. (emphasis added).
57 Id.
58 See infra notes 102-28 and accompanying text discussing "fair use" and its application to the
Belamax case.
59 464 U.S. at 456.
60 Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist).
61 Id. at 489. See supra note 32 for the text ofJustice Blackmun's reasoning with respect to this
issue.
62 456 U.S. 844 (1982). See infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Ives standard for contributory trademark infringement.
63 464 U.S. at 489. The courts have had considerable difficulty with the actual wording of the
Ives standard. In Ives, the Supreme Court evidently approved the standard established by the Sec-
ond Circuit in the first appeal of ves, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979). The wording used by the Second
Circuit was: "suggested, even if only by implication." Id. at 636. In the second appeal to the Sec-
ond Circuit, the wording was altered somewhat to: "a suggestion, at least by implication." 638 F.2d
538, 543 (2d Cir. 1981). See CTI, supra note 1, 650-51, for a possible explanation for the variation in
wording between the two decisions. The majority in Betamax stated the Ives standard to be: "inten-
tionally induc[e]." 464 U.S. at 439 n. 19 (citing the Ives case, 456 U.S. at 855). For further discussion
of this issue, see infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
64 464 U.S. at 490.
65 Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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known that its Betamax recorders would be used for infringing purposes,
it should be liable for such infringement on the basis of those sales. 66
Justice Blackmun, however, fully appreciated the need for at least
some qualitative limitation of such an expansive rule. Although Justice
Blackmun objected to the wholesale importation of the "staple article of
commerce" doctrine of patent law into copyright law, he recognized
"that many of the concerns underlying the 'staple article of commerce
doctrine' were present in copyright law as well."' 67 He then agreed with
the district court that "if liability for infringement were imposed on the
manufacturer or seller for every product used to infringe... the 'wheels
of commerce' would be blocked." 68
The minority then postulated its standard in a negative and a posi-
tive formulation: (1) There is no contributory infringement "if a signifi-
cant portion of the product's use is noninfringing,"69 (2) There is
contributory infringement "[i]f virtually all of the product's use ... is to
infringe ... .70 Presumably, these formulations are the converse of one
another. If a "significant portion" of use is not infringing, then "virtually
all" use is not infringing and vice versa. The question of technical capa-
bility is excluded. It thus becomes simply a question of the amount of
direct infringement that has occurred through the use of a VCR.
Justice Blackmun stated that his approach was "very different" from
that of the majority.7 1 However, in both approaches the question of lia-
bility for contributory infringement depended on the quantum of direct
infringement. Only the result was different, with the majority finding fair
use and hence an insignificant amount of direct infringement, while the
dissent found unfair use and hence a significant amount of direct
infringement.
Both the majority and minority appreciated the tensions created by
finding contributory infringement for the sale of a copying device such as
a VCR. The majority emphasized the impact on free competition if liabil-
ity were imposed, 72 while Justice Blackmun found the majority's analysis
flawed in that it failed to separate the question of liability "from the diffi-
culty of fashioning an appropriate remedy." 73
In any event, even the minority had difficulty with entirely enjoining
the sale of VCR's. If liability were imposed, the dissent would look to
66 At an earlier pointJustice Blackmun stated: "It is undisputed in this case that Sony had rea-
son to know the Betamax would be used by some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air." Id.
at 489.
67 Id. at 491.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 493.
72 Id. at 440-441. In Betamay, the Studios sought an injunction against the continued sale of
Betamaxes. With respect to remedies, the majority stated:
The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents seek, in effect, to declare
VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a
judicially created compulsory license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that
respondents, for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in
VTR's to Sony in return for a royalty.
Id. at 441 n.21.
73 Id. at 494.
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alternative remedies short of a property solution, such as, the payment of
royalties or the requirement that VCR's be rendered technically incapa-
ble of recording copyrighted works off-the-air. 74 These proposed solu-
tions imply that copyrights, at least in this context, are somewhat less
than "property" and that the Court should implement some "quasi prop-
erty" 75 or "compulsory license" 76 solution. If a remedy less than an in-
junction were granted, this would avoid the necessity of a narrow
definition of contributory infringement or a broad one of fair use to
avoid interference with the "rights of others freely to engage in substan-
tially unrelated areas of commerce." 77 Both the majority and minority
opinions, however, failed to address the policy issue of why the burden
should be placed upon the developer of technology to protect copyright
owners from how and why that technology is used, when it may be used
in noninfringing or infringing ways, depending upon the personal inter-
vention of the user.
In the following part of this article the five factors, 78 that bear upon
the scope of protection traditionally provided in contributory infringe-
ment will be analyzed with particular reference to the "trilogy" of cases
dealing with contributory infringement of intellectual property. 79
II. Scope of Contributory Infringement
A. Standard for Direct Infringement
The sine qua non of contributory infringement is direct infringe-
ment just as the commission of a tort by one person is the sine qua non
for imposing liability on another person for contributing to the commis-
sion of that tort.80 If, as has been the case in patent law, a strict standard
for direct infringement is imposed, this narrows the scope of contribu-
74 After listing royalties and a "jamming" device, Justice Blackmun went on to say: "Even were
an appropriate remedy not available at this time, the Court should not misconstrue copyright hold-
ers' rights in a manner that prevents enforcement of them when, through development of better
techniques, an appropriate remedy becomes available." 464 U.S. at 494 (footnote omitted). Justice
Blackmun also mentioned the possibility of "even some form of limited injunction." Id at 499.
75 In International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918), a "quasi property"
theory was applied to prevent a competitor from "misappropriating" the "hot" news of another.
The underlying rationale appears to be "commercial morality" and protecting the investment of the
news gathered, by not permitting the copier "to reap where it has not sown .. " Id. at 239. Any
relief provided in Betamax would go beyond competitors; the parties were not competitors and pre-
sumably the same relief would also be available to other marketers of VCR's.
76 The majority indicated that awarding royalties would be judicially creating a compulsory li-
cense. See supra note 72. Compulsory licenses are available under Copyright Act of 1946 with re-
spect to certain types of activities: certain cable broadcasts (17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982)); certain
phonorecords of musical works (id. § 115 (1982 & Supp. 1986)); jukeboxes (id. § 116 (1982)). How-
ever, no general right to a compulsory license is provided under the Copyright Act, the Patent Act or
the Trademark Act. Cf Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) ("Com-
pulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system. We decline to manufacture such a requirement out
of § 271(d)") (footnote omitted).
77 464 U.S. at 442.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42 (identifying the factors).
79 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Inwood Laboratories v.
Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S 176
(1980).
80 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979), quoted infra note 252.
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tory infringement accordingly.8 1 Direct infringement is defined in the
Patent Act as "making," "using" or "selling" the claimed invention.8 2
From as early as Prouty v. Ruggles 83 through, at least, Deepsouth Packing Co.
v. Laitram Corp. ,84 the Supreme Court has interpreted these terms nar-
rowly.8 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co. 86 urged that contributory infringement is needed by patent
owners because of the overly rigorous standard imposed for direct
infringement.8 7
In addition, statutory and common law exceptions may preclude a
finding of direct infringement and thus exclude contributory infringe-
ment. In patent law, for example, the "repair/reconstruction" doctrine
has also imposed a significant limitation to finding direct infringement
once a patented product has been marketed with the authorization of the
patent owner.8 8 The patent owner not only gives an implied license to
the purchaser to use the invention but also an implied license to "repair"
it. This has been broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court in Aro Manu-
facturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro 1)89 to permit any repair
short of a "second creation" of the patented invention before it can be
considered an impermissible infringing reconstruction. 90
The standards for direct infringement in trademark and copyright
cases are more ambiguous, perhaps inherently so because of the nature
of the subject matter. 91 In trademark law, "likelihood of confusion" is
the statutory92 as well as common law9 3 standard, and courts have gener-
81 For a discussion of the strict standard for direct patent infringement, see CPI, supra note 1, at
108-11.
82 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982). See supra note 28 for the text of this provision.
83 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336 (1842).
84 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding that it was not direct infringement ("making") to package sepa-
rately the parts of a patented machine and ship them to a foreign country for assembly).
85 Recently Congress has agreed that the standard of Deepsouth was too strict. Section 271 has
been amended to overrule Deepsouth, defining infringement to include supplying "in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion" of a patented invention or a "nonstaple" for use in a
patented invention, even though the invention itself is completed outside of the United States. 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) (Supp. IV 1986), added by amendment Pub. L. No. 98-622, Title I, § 101(a), 98 Stat.
3383 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has gone further and found infringement
when the accused infringer had tested "significant, unpatented assemblies of elements.., enabling
the infringer to deliver the patented combination in parts to the buyer, without testing the entire
combination .... Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19-20 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
86 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
87 "This protection [contributing infringement] is of particular importance in situations, like the
oil lamp case itself, where enforcement against direct infringers would be difficult, and where the
technicalities of patent law make it relatively easy to profit from another's invention without risking
a charge of direct infringement." Id. at 188.
88 See generally 4 D. CHIsUM, supra note 1, § 16.03; CPI/US, supra note 1, at 200-03.
89 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
90 See Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuhler, 377 U.S. 422 (1964) (permissible repair to resize and relocate 6
out of 35 parts of a patented canning machine); see also Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 3
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (permissible repair to rebuild clutches by production line
method using new (no more than four) and used parts randomly selected).
91 Although the standard for direct infringement of intellectual property may range from the
rigid to the ethereal, direct infringement is applied on a strict liability basis. See supra note 29. The
"no fault" theory provides a distinct advantage to those asserting contributory infringement against
intermediaries who provide consumers with the means to directly infringe.
92 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), as amended, § 32(I)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982); see
supra note 28 for the text of this provision. State trademark acts generally follow the same formula-
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ally adopted a multi-factor test to assist in this determination. 94 Other
limitations on direct trademark infringement, such as "collateral use"95
or "fair use," 96 are related to the ultimate standard of likelihood of con-
fusion and have not played a significant role in defining the scope of con-
tributory infringement in trademark law.
Copyright law may even be more ethereal in its standard for direct
infringement. The Copyright Act defines copyright infringement merely
as a violation of one of the exclusive rights specified in section 10697 of
the Copyright Act.98 The ultimate resolution of the issue may depend
upon a determination of whether the "expression" of the work has been
copied rather than its underlying "idea." 99 Recent cases dealing with the
alleged infringement of computer software show the difficulty of apply-
ing the idea/expression dichotomy in a highly technical setting. 100
The Copyright Act subjects the "exclusive rights" to certain express
exceptions. 101 The "fair use" doctrine, as now codified in section 107 of
the Copyright Act, provides one of the most significant exceptions to di-
rect infringement.' 0 2 However, in the words of Justice Blackmun in the
tion, 46 states having adopted the Model State Trademark Act, which provides in section 11 (a):
"Such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive." See UNITED STATES TRADEMARK
Assoc., STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (1987); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 22:3.
93 See 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 22:30, 22:31.
94 See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979) (listing eight
factors: strength of the work, similarity of the works, proximity of products, quality of defendant's
product, bridging the gap between markets, actual confusion, good faith, and sophistication of buy-
ers). See also In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (listing 13 factors
to be considered in testing likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052
(1982), for registration purposes).
95 See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924) (Holmes, J.).
96 Regarding the fair use defense to trademark infringement, see I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 11:17 (truthful description); id. § 13:3 (using own name); id. § 14:7 (geographic origin).
97 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See supra note 25 for a list of the exclusive rights of section 106.
98 17 U.S.C. § 501 (a) (1982). See supra note 28 for the text of this provision.
99 As stated by Judge Learned Hand: "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an
imitation has gone beyond copying the idea, and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must
therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489
(2d Cir. 1960); see also Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977); Nicols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931).
100 Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Apple Computer
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, 685
F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). Cf Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir. 1987); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1978).
101 The exclusive rights of section 106 are made subject to 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). Sections 106-112 define limitations on exclusive rights and sections 113-118 relate to the
scope of exclusive rights.
102 Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, includ-
ing such use by production in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include- (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
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Betamax case: "The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justifi-
cation, 'the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.' "103 As if
this point needed any further demonstration, the majority and dissent in
Betamax proceeded to disagree over the doctrine's application as a gen-
eral principle and how each and every one of the factors were to be taken
into account in its application.10 4 They even disagreed over the rele-
vancy of "authorized time-shifting," where copyright owners have con-
sented, at least by implication, to the recording of their works off-the-air
for later replay. The majority concluded that the Studios lacked standing
to represent a class consisting of all copyright owners and only had an
interest in protecting their own copyrighted works.10 5 The majority rea-
soned that if the Studios were to prevail, broadcasters who are only capa-
ble of reaching their markets via time-shifting would suffer. The dissent,
on the other hand, argued that while an injunction against the sale of
VCR's may harm copyright owners who authorized time-shifting, their
concerns could be accommodated by "fashioning an appropriate rem-
edy."' 106 The dissent did not mention the potential interest of VCR pur-
chasers who, even though authorized to record certain copyrighted
works, may be required to pay higher prices for VCR's used in whole or
at least in part to record such authorized programs. 0 7
More specifically with respect to fair use under section 107 of the
Copyright Act, the majority considered the most critical element of fair
use analysis to be whether the recording was being undertaken for com-
mercial or noncommercial (nonprofit making) reasons.' 08 The dissent
took a different tack and looked to whether the recording constituted a
"productive" use of the work as compared to a "nonproductive" one,
with time-shifting for the convenience of the viewer classified as non-
productive. 10 9 The dissent's position, however, gives some meaning to
the first sentence of section 107, which gives examples of "fair use,"
"such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multi-
ple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . ". .. "10 All of
these are productive purposes as envisioned by the dissent."'
103 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1982) (quoting Dellar v.
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
104 See supra note 102 for the text of section 107 identifying the four factors. See infra notes 112-
24 for a discussion of both the Betamax majority and dissent's analysis of these factors.
105 464 U.S. at 446.
106 Id. at 493-94.
107 Although a royalty rate could take into account the fact that a certain percentage of VCR use
was to record "authorized" off-the-air works, VCR manufacturers would presumably pass on royalty
payments to purchasers. This would result in "overpayment" by consumers who only recorded "au-
thorized" works and "underpayment" by those who recorded only "unauthorized" works. The end
result would be for the noninfringers to subsidize the infringers. But see Laeffer, The Betamax Case:
Another Compulsory License in Copyright Law, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 651, 680-81 (1982) (recommending a
legislative compulsory license for home recording).
108 464 U.S. at 442, 448-49.
109 Id. at 447-80.
110 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See supra note 102 for the text of this provision. But see HousE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, H.R. Rep. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-70 (1976)
(not fair use if classroom use but the purpose for multiple copies was to avoid purchasing originals).
111 464 U.S. at 495.
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With respect to the four factors of section 107 to be considered in a
fair use analysis, the majority, in an essentially summary fashion, dis-
posed of the first three. As to factor (1) - "purpose and character of the
use of the copyrighted work" - the majority concluded that, because the
unauthorized time-shifting copying is for noncommercial purposes, a
presumption of fairness should apply as compared to a presumption of
unfairness if for commercial purposes. 112 The dissent, on the other
hand, interpreted this factor within its productive versus nonproductive
construct, with the intent of the section being construed to encourage
copying only for the purpose of benefitting others. 1 3 When the only
interest served by home recording was that of the recorder in time-shift-
ing, this, Justice Blackmun asserted, "involved no such humanitarian
impulse."114
In one sentence the majority dispatched the next two factors, con-
cluding that when the "nature of the copyrighted work" (factor (2)) is
considered in light of the fact that time-shifting merely permits the
viewer to delay what was available free of charge, the "amount and sub-
stantiality" of copying (factor (3)) loses it "ordinary effect of militating
against fair use." ' 15 The point of the majority evidently is that the nature
of the work may be determined by its availability at one time without
charge and that somehow this bears upon also the question of how much
is copied. One may conclude from this analysis that the time-shifting
motive of the recorder seems determinative of both factors (2) and (3)
without any further investigation.
The dissent, however, focused on the type of work being recorded
rather than on the motive for recording in analyzing factor (2) and found
this factor to be contrary to a finding of fair use because of the entertain-
ment nature of the works recorded off the air. 1 6 Moreover, the dissent
argued since the entire copyrighted works were being recorded for a
nonproductive purpose, it was "even more devastating to the Court's in-
terpretation," and concluded that the quantity of copying might in itself
preclude a finding of fair use under factor (3).117
The final and often most problematic factor in a fair use analysis is
the "effect of the use upon the potential market for or the value of the
copyrighted work." The dissent emphasized the potential market and
identified such potential detrimental effects to the Studios as limiting their
ability to market their works in movie theaters or by rental or sale of
prerecorded tapes, reducing license fees because of reduction in rerun
audiences, reducing income from advertisers who would be unwilling to
pay higher prices because of the ability of recorders to skip commer-
cials. 1"8 Justice Blackmun, while admitting that the time-shifting market
was created by the invention of the VCR, asserted that obviously VCR
112 Id. at 449.
113 Id. at 496.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 449-50.
116 Id. at 449-50.
117 Id. at 497.
118 Id. at 482-86, 497-98.
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purchasers were willing to pay for this privilege by their purchase.119
This type of reasoning may serve as an example of the circuitous nature
of any market analysis under section 107(4). As pointed out by Professor
Goldstein, "[w]hether a use will affect 'the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work' necessarily turns on whether the use will be
proscribed."' 120
With such an illustration of the potential loss of market, the minority
would then place the burden upon the accused infringer to demonstrate
there was no potential for harm. 12' The majority, on the other hand,
placed the burden on the Studios to "demonstrate that time-shifting
would cause any likelihood of non-minimal harm to the potential market
for, or the value of, their copyrighted works."' 122 If commercial use is
involved, "some meaningful likelihood of future harm may be pre-
sumed;" however, for noncommercial time-shifting, the Court concluded
that the "likelihood must be demonstrated" for otherwise "the prohibi-
tion of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas
without any countervailing benefits."' 23 If the fair use doctrine permits
copying, which would otherwise constitute infringement, then placing
the burden on the copyright owner with respect to the four factors in
section 107, particularly factor (4) (market effect), would seem contrary
to the normal allotment of burdens in tort law.' 24
The peculiar holding in Betamax is not that the fair use doctrine
serves as a limitation on the scope of application of contributory infringe-
ment by limiting direct infringement, but that the quantum of direct in-
fringement, as inversely related to the quantum of fair use, becomes the
standard for contributory infringement. Direct infringement is not only
the sine qua non of contributory infringement, but also a finding of sig-
nificant direct infringement (i.e., the absence of significant fair use)
proves contributory infringement. The relevance, or irrelevance, of the
nature of the article being sold (i.e., whether a staple or nonstaple) on
the contributory infringement issue will be considered in section D
herein.
Both the majority and dissent agreed that the purpose of the copy-
right statute is to implement the constitutional mandate to provide in-
centives for creation of copyrightable works. 125 The majority concluded
that prohibiting noncommercial uses need not be ordered in order to
119 Id. at 485. Justice Blackmun reasoned: "These persons are willing to pay for the privilege of
watching copyrighted work at their convenience, as is evidenced by the fact that they are willing to
pay for VTR's and tapes; undoubtedly, most also would be willing to pay some kind of royalty. to
copyright holders." Id. One might conclude to the contrary that the willingness of consumers to
pay for VCR's and tapes might be in part based on their ability to record programs without cost.
Moreover, it is not apparent that television stations would be willing to pay a higher fee to receive
authorization for their viewers to record programs off-the-air, if offered by the copyright owners.
120 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 780.
121 464 U.S. at 485.
122 Id. at 456.
123 Id. at 450-51 (footnotes omitted).
124 Aside from consent to invasions to the person, tort law placed the burden on the defendant to
prove that his or her intentional conduct was privileged and hence not tortious. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 comment c (1979).
125 464 U.S. at 429 (majority); id. at 479-80 (minority).
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protect the author's incentive to create. 126 The dissent found the inclu-
sion of nonproductive uses within the copyright grant to be a needed
incentive and concluded that, even though the copyright owners did not
create the market for time-shifting, they should be entitled to exploit this
new market.' 27 However, in terms of incentives, it is clear that prior to
the invention of the video recorder no copyrightable works were induced
by the nonexistent time-shifting market. It hardly seems likely that many
of the Studios' copyrights came into being, in whole or even in part, be-
cause of the potential for precluding time-shifting by owners of
VCR's. 128 It appears equally clear that if the Supreme Court had held
that unauthorized time-shifting was not fair use and there was a signifi-
cant amount of direct infringement by VCR users, copyright owners
would have a significantly expanded market that could be exploited by
royalties, fees or other means, if not by injunction. If the scope of con-
tributory infringement is made to depend upon a fair use analysis, at
least one thing may be guaranteed: contributory infringement has be-
come as troublesome a doctrine as fair use, and perhaps one even more
troublesome because of the additional factors that bear upon the scope
of contributory infringement.
B. Contributing Conduct and Fault
Once it is established that one or more torts have been committed,
liability will be imposed on those who have contributed to that tort, pro-
vided the contribution has been of a particular nature and according to a
particular fault standard (viz., intent, negligence or strict liability). 129
The scope of protection under contributory infringement is accordingly
directly related to the nature of the originating contribution and the fault
standard applied to the contributor. 130
For reasons of convenience, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restate-
ment) categorization found in Chapter 44, entitled "Contributing
Tortfeasors," will be used as a framework for analyzing the contribution
and fault requirements for general tort law and its application to contrib-
126 Id. at 450-51.
127 Id. at 485.
128 Serious questions have been raised whether copyright is a needed incentive for the creation of
certain works. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright. A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970). Cf Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright
Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1100 (1971).
Moreover, if the work or invention would have been created irrespective of the availability of
copyright or patent protection, the copyright or patent statute could be said to be providing an
incentive therefor. Economists studying the patent system have concluded that protecting such non-
induced inventions may result in a net economic loss to society. See Oddi, The International Patent
System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (reviewing economic
literature).
129 Other categories falling between negligence and strict liability, could be added, such as "gross
negligence," "willful," "wanton" or "reckless" conduct. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 34 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
130 If strict liability is applied to contributory infringers, as it is for direct infringers, this would
provide a broad scope of protection. Conversely, if contributory infringement were limited to inten-
tional conduct on the part of the alleged contributory infringement, this would result in a significant
narrowing of the tort compared to strict liability. An intermediate scope of protection for contribu-
tory infringement would result if premised upon a finding of negligent conduct by the contributor.
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utory infringement.13 1 As previously mentioned, the principal theories
relied upon with respect to contributory infringement of intellectual
property have been concerted conduct and inducement of infringement.
The discussion in this section will focus on these theories.13 2
1. Agreed Concerted Conduct
Section 876 of the Restatement imposes liability upon a contributing
tortfeasor "for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious con-
duct of another" under three separate rules, two of which are particularly
relevant here.133 Section 876(a) imposes liability upon the contributing
tortfeasor for committing "a tortious act in concert with the other or pur-
suant to a common design with him."13 4 According to comment a on this
clause, "[p]arties are acting in concert when they act in accordance with
an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accom-
plish a particular result."13 5 The agreement need not be expressed in
words and may be implied and understood to exist from the conduct
itself.'36
It is not the conspiracy among the parties that makes their conduct
concerted, but it is essential that the conduct of each of the parties be in
itself tortious. As stated in comment b, "there must be acts of a tortious
character in carrying [the plan] into execution."' 37 The essence of such
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Ch. 44 (1979). See also 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER, supra note 129, § 46.
132 Also considered in section F, below, in reference to the duty owed to an intellectual property
owner by a seller of a product used in direct infringement, is another theory designated in the Re-
statement as "independent concurrent or consecutive conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 279 (1979). A fourth category is also included in the Restatement, where liability is imposed when
"two or more persons are under a common duty and failure to perform" results in injury to the
person to whom the common duty is owed. lId § 878. This category is not directly applicable to
contributory infringement and will not be further considered.
Justice Stevens categorized contributory infringement as a species of vicarious liability. Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984); see supra text accompanying note
22. The Restatement uses the term "contributory tortfeasor" in a much less comprehensive sense,
excluding liability based upon master-servant, agency or partnership principles. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 875 comment a (1979).
133 For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Section 876 (c) will be considered infra, section E.
The Institute makes a caveat concerning the applicability of § 876 when the theory of liability
with respect to the actor or the other person is strict liability rather than intentional or negligent
conduct. This caveat may have particular relevance to intellectual property in that direct infringe-
ment in patent, trademark, and copyright law is dealt with on a strict liability basis, while contribu-
tory infringement, in the main, requires some "fault" on the part of the actor.
134 Id. § 876(a).
135 lI- § 876 comment a.
136 A classic example of an express agreement is the agreement among three persons to steal the
victim's silver buttons, when one batters the victim, the other falsely imprisons him, and the third
actually takes the buttons. Each contributing tortfeasor is liable not only for the tort committed by
him but also for the torts of the others. See PROSSER, supra note 129, at 323 (citing Smithson v.
Garth, 3 Lev. 324,83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1601)). A common form of imposing liability on the basis of an
implied or tacit agreement may be found in the drag-racing cases. Id.
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 comment b (1979).
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concerted conduct is the imposition of liability for the entire injury be-
cause of the express or tacit agreement to engage in the tortious conduct.
The application of an agreed concerted conduct theory in intellec-
tual property would commonly be with respect to a claim of direct in-
fringement, but there may also be instances where contributory
infringement is also involved. For example, in patent law, three parties
may agree, expressly or impliedly, that one would make the invention,
another would sell it, and the third would use it.138 In trademark law, the
agreement may be for one to supply labels bearing the trademark of an-
other, the second to affix those labels to its goods and to sell them to a
third party, who, in turn, is to sell the goods bearing the trademark to the
public.13 9 A copyright example would be an agreement for one to pro-
duce an unauthorized motion picture based on a copyrighted work, an-
other to distribute the movie, and a third to publicly perform the
unauthorized work.140 Any one of the three could be individually held as
direct or contributory infringers, as the case may be, provided the indi-
vidual conduct satisfies the standard for that tort. Moreover, all three
could be held liable for the tortious conduct of the others upon a con-
certed conduct theory in agreeing to act in furtherance of the common
design to infringe.141
2. Implied Concerted Conduct
Section 876(b) of the Restatement provides another basis for imposing
liability for concerted conduct. Section 876(b) imposes liability upon a
contributing tortfeasor who "knows that the other's conduct constitutes
138 This would be directly analogous to the "silver button" case, Smithson v. Garth, 3 Lev. 324,
83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1601). Each of the participants would be a direct infringer under 35 U.S.C. § 271
(a) (1982), quoted supra note 28.
139 In this hypothetical, the second and third parties would be categorized as direct infringers for
using the trademark on goods in commerce; the first would be a contributory infringer for it has
merely supplied that trademark but has not used it with respect to goods. The Lanham Act
§ 32(1)(b) provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant.. . (b) reproduce, counter-
feit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, printers, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offer-
ing for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(b) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 161-63 for a discussion of this
provision.
140 In this hypothetical, the first would directly infringe the copyright owner's exclusive right "to
prepare derivative works" (17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982)). The other two parties could be categorized
as contributory infringers because they are, respectively, distributing (see id. § 106(3)) and perform-
ing (see id. § 106(4)) the motion picture (the derivative work) rather than the copyrighted novel itself.
Alternatively, if the derivative work is categorized as a copy of the original work, then the distributor
and performer also may be said to be direct infringers. The definition of "copies" in the Copyright
Act provides:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
The term "copies" includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the
work is first fixed.
Id. § 101.
141 There was no allegation in Betamax that Sony and the purchasers of its recorders had ex-
pressly or even impliedly agreed to infringe copyrights of the Studios.
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a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself."' 42 The contributing tortfeasor must thus
have actual knowledge of the tortious conduct of the other.143 With such
knowledge the contributing tortfeasor need not necessarily be under a
separate duty to the third person for this rule to apply. The limit of lia-
bility is for encouragement or assistance in the other's breaching of the
known duty. 144 This type of concerted conduct may be designated "im-
plied concerted" conduct where the concert is implied by virtue of the
actual knowledge of the contributing tortfeasor of the breach of duty to
be committed by the other.
In patent law, after much trial and tribulation, contributory infringe-
ment as now codified in section 271(c) 145 of the Patent Act, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court,' 46 imposes both of the requirements of
section 876(b) of the Restatement. The contributory infringer must give
"substantial assistance or encouragement" of a very specific form,
namely, sell an article of commerce having no substantial noninfringing
use-a nonstaple. This must be done with actual knowledge on the part
of the contributory infringer that the other's (direct infringer's) conduct
"constitutes a breach of duty" in the form of directly infringing a particu-
lar patent known to the contributory infringer through the use of the
nonstaple so designed to infringe.' 47
Wallace v. Holmes,'14 decided in 1871, had great influence in the de-
velopment of this theory in patent law as well as in trademark law. Faced
with the dilemma that defendant did not directly infringe plaintiff's pat-
ent, Judge Woodruff created a fiction of implying concerted conduct
from the nature of the article being sold-a special oil burner to which
the user added a standard chimney to complete the patented combina-
tion of an oil lamp. 149 Provided defendant knew of plaintiff's patent and
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
143 That "actual" as compared to "constructive" knowledge is meant is made clear by the use of
alternative constructions, such as "knows or should know" (id. § 877(a)), or "knowing or having
reason to know" (id. § 877(c)). See definitions of "reason to know" (id. § 12(1)), and "should know"
(id. § 12(2)).
144 Another limitation would be the foreseeability of how the other would act. See id. § 876 com-
ment d, illustration 11.
145 Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or com-
position, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
146 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro H), 377 U.S. 476 (1964), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 152-54.
147 Id. at 488.
148 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
149 Plaintiff's patent covered the combination of the burner and chimney. Thus, defendant was
not strictly a direct infringer of the patent; its purchasers were. Under such circumstances Judge
Woodruff implied concerted conduct, stating:
Here, the actual concert with others is a certain inference from the nature of the case, and
the distinct efforts of the defendants to bring the burner in question into use, which can
only be done by adding the chimney. The defendants have not, perhaps, made an actual
pre-arrangement with any particular person to supply the chimney to be added to the
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then proceeded to sell the special oil burner, Wallace v. Holmes would
lend early support to Restatement section 876(b).
Just prior to the turn of the century, the importance of the nature of
the article being sold was made clear by Judge Taft as a means of infer-
ring the intent of the seller of that article. In Thomson-Houston Electric Co.
v. Ohio Brass Co. ,5o Judge Taft reasoned that no inference of intent to
infringe should be drawn from the sale of a staple article that had nonin-
fringing uses. If the article had no use but in infringing the patent in
question, however, then the inference would be drawn.' 51
If concerted conduct could be implied from the nonstaple nature of
the article being sold, this rule was broader than the Restatement require-
ment under section 876(b) that the contributing tortfeasor have knowl-
edge "that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty." The
knowledge issue was not resolved by the Supreme Court until 1964 in
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro 11).152 Prior to
Aro II, various courts had held that actual knowledge of the patent in
question was not required for contributory infringement either under the
common law or under section 271 (c) when enacted.153 However, in Aro
II a majority of the justices concluded that the seller of the nonstaple
must have actual knowledge that the "combination for which his compo-
nent was especially designed was both patented and infringing."'' 54
The development of contributory trademark infringement has paral-
leled that of patent contributory infringement, including the adoption of
the staple/nonstaple dichotomy to imply intent, at least with respect to
labels and trade dress. 155 Nonetheless, trademark law has been more re-
ceptive to general tort theory, including negligence as applied to contrib-
burner; but, every sale they make is a proposal to the purchaser to do this, and his purchase
is a consent with the defendants that he will do it, or cause it to be done.
Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80. Judge Woodruff, however, did not view the tort of the defendant as sepa-
rate and distinct from direct infringement. The very troublesome term "contributory infringement"
was not adopted until 15 years later. Snyder v. Bunnell, 29 F. 47, 49 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (Coxe, J.).
150 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897).
151 In the words of Judge Taft:
[I]t is a matter of certain inference from the circumstance that the parts sold can only be
used in the combinations patented. Of course, such an inference could not be drawn had
the articles, the sale or offering of which was the subject of complaint, been adapted to
other uses than in the patented combination.... But, where the article can only be used in
a patented combination, the inference of the intention of the maker and seller is certain,
and the right of the patentee to injunction ought, we think, to be equally certain.
Id. at 723-24.
152 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
153 For cases prior to section 271(c), see Southern States Equip. Corp. v. USCO Power Equip.
Corp., 209 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1953); Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Ruth, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936);
Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Adams Grease Gun Corp., 52 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1931); New York Scaffolding Co.
v. Whitney, 224 F. 452 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 640 (1915). For cases after section 271 (c), see
Convertible Top Replacement Co. v. Aro Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1962), on remand of Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Aro I), rev'd in part, aff'd in part,
Aro 11, 377 U.S. 476 (1964); Freedman v. Friedman, 242 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1957); Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 119 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 122 (D. Mass. 1958) (by implication).
154 377 U.S. at 488 (footnote omitted). The footnote indicated that Justice White joined the four
dissenting justices in this holding. The four other majority justices were of the "view that the knowl-
edge Congress meant to require was simply knowledge that the component was especially designed
for use in a combination and was not a staple article suitable for substantial other use, and not
knowledge that the combination was either patented or infringing." Id- at 488 n.8.
155 See CTI, supra note 1, at 619-22, tracing this development.
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utory infringement, perhaps because trademarks are part of the broader
body of unfair competition law. 156
Among the earliest cases imposing liability on an implied concerted
conduct theory are the so-called "label cases," where labels that imitated
another's trademark were sold to a manufacturer who affixed the trade-
mark to its goods and sold them in commerce.' 57 In the first case that
used the term contributory infringement in reference to trademarks, Von
Mumm v. Wittemann,' 58 the court drew the same inferences with respect to
the nature of the thing being sold as was done in patent law. In this case,
defendant sold labels for use on champagne which essentially duplicated
those of complainants except for substituting the name "S.F. Munn" for
"G.H. Mumm & Co." From the sale of these labels, an inference of
fraudulent intent could be drawn based essentially on the nonstaple na-
ture of such a label, that is, it had no use but in infringing plaintiff's
trademark. 159 On the other hand, the sale by defendant of neck capsules
that only bore the description "Extra Dry" was not enjoined because no
inference of fraudulent intent could be drawn from such a capsule; in
essence, it was a staple that could be used on anyone's champagne. 160
Contributory trademark infringement of the implied concerted con-
duct type is now codified in section 32(1)(b) of the Lanham Act, which
renders a person liable in a civil action "who shall reproduce, counter-
feit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered trademark... intended to be
used in commerce with respect to goods likely to cause confusion."' 6 '
Although this provision is not completely free of ambiguity, it appears
reasonably clear that relief would be provided under section 32(1)(b), at
least in the form of an injunction, on a strict liability basis. 162 With re-
spect to the knowledge requirement, the final sentence of section 32(1)
specifies that for the registrant to recover damages or profits under
clause (b), it is necessary that the supplier of labels or trade dress have
knowledge that "such imitation is intended to be used to cause confu-
sion," i.e. knowledge of direct infringement of a trademark. This thus
protects "innocent" printers from money damages; however, they could,
of course, still be enjoined from the future replication of such imitations
used in direct infringement.
The more difficult cases, which may fall within either the implied
concerted conduct theory or the induced conduct theory, are those
where, rather than a label or trade dress bearing the trademark being
156 See Coming Glass Works v. Jeannette Glass Co., 308 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Stix
Prods. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
157 See, e.g., Hildreth v. Sparks Mfg. Co., 99 F. 484 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); Hennessy v. Hermann,
89 F. 669 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898); Von Mumm v. Wittemann, 85 F. 966 (C.C.S.D.N.Y), aff'dper curiam,
91 F. 126 (2d Cir. 1898); Cuervo v.Jacob Henkell Co., 50 F. 471 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1892); Carson v. Ury,
39 F. 777 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889); De Kuyper v. Witteman, 23 F. 871 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885); Sartor v.
Schaden, 125 Iowa 696, 101 N.W. 511 (1904).
158 85 F. 966 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 91 F. 126 (2d Cir. 1898).
159 Id. at 967.
160 Id. at 968.
161 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(b) (1982), quoted in full supra note 139.
162 As indicated by Professor McCarthy, it is not clear whether it is the intent of the labeler or the
seller of the goods or the intent to use the labels in the sale or to cause confusion. 2J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 25:5B; see also id. § 25:5C.
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sold, the product being sold itself simulates the product of the origina-
tor. 16 3 Such product simulation facilitates the "passing off" of the prod-
uct of the simulator for that of the originator, either by affixing the
trademark of the originator to the look-alike product or by implying
through the appearance of the product itself that its source is the origina-
tor. The originator of the product may protect it directly by registering
the product configuration as a trademark1 64 or, if unregistered, by rely-
ing upon section 43(a) of the Lanham Act' 65 or the common law tort of
"unprivileged imitation."' 66 The general requirements for protection
are that the product's configuration must be "nonfunctional" and indi-
cate source, and finally, that the simulation must cause likelihood of
confusion. 167
163 Ifa registered trademark is not involved, such case may more appropriately be categorized as
involving "contributory unfair competition." See CTI, supra note 1, at 622-27.
164 See I J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, § § 7:23-7:33; Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality'" in Trade-
mark Law, 22 Hous. L. REv. 925 (1985).
165 Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or serv-
ices, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe
or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and
any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or descrip-
tion or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or
deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by
any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region
in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). The courts have read into this section the require-
ments of the common law tort of "product simulation." See Oddi, Consumer Motivation in Trademark
and Unfair Competition Law, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1, 20 n.8 7 (1986) (collecting cases); see also Note, The
Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 77 (1982).
166 The tort of "unprivileged limitation" is defined in the Restatement of Torts as follows:
One who markets goods, the physical appearance of which is a copy or imitation of the
physical appearance of the goods of which another is the initial distributor, markets them
with an unprivileged imitation, under the rule stated in § 711, if his goods are of the same
class as those of the other and are sold in a market in which the other's interest is protected,
and
(a) he copied or imitated the appearance after obtaining access to or procuring the
goods, or their labels, wrappers, containers, styles or designs, by improper means or
on his promise not to copy or imitate them, or
(b) the copied or imitated feature has acquired generally in the market a special sig-
nificance identifying the other's goods, and
(i) the copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective purchasers to regard his
goods as those of the other, and,
(ii) the copied or imitated feature is nonfunctional, or, if it is functional, he does
not take reasonable steps to inform prospective purchasers that the goods
which he markets are not those of the other.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 741 (1938). There would appear to be some question of the viability of
this doctrine after Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffell Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting Co., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Compare with SK&F Co. v. Promo Pharmaceutical Labs,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980), holding:
Moreover, it has been held that it is actionable conduct under New Jersey law for a drug
manufacturer to put a product in the hands of a pharmacist in a form in which the manufac-
turer can reasonably anticipate that it may be passed off as another product even if the
manufacturer does nothing else to encourage passing off.... The law in other states is
similar in this respect.
Id. at 1062 (citations omitted).
167 Some variation in how these requirements are defined and applied may be expected depend-
ing upon whether a registered trademark is involved (entitled to a presumption of validity, Lanham
[Vol. 64:47
CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Because the principal trademark contributory infringement case-
Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories 168 -was decided on an induced con-
duct theory, the problem raised by product simulation in this context will
be addressed below in this section.169 It should be appreciated, however,
that there are significantly different competitive effects arising from en-
joining the sale of labels or trade dress bearing the trademark of another
as compared to enjoining the sale of the product itself.' 70
In copyright law, the Betamax case itself may be seen implicitly as
employing the implied concerted conduct theory. The majority stated
the issue to be: "If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this
case, it must rest on the fact that it sold equipment with constructive
knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material." 171 It would appear that, if
the majority by "vicarious liability" means liability based upon contribu-
tory infringement and if the constructive knowledge of the infringement
is to be based upon the staple or nonstaple nature of the article being
sold, the underlying theory may be categorized as implied concerted con-
duct. 172 The Court went on to resolve this issue by making an analogy to
patent law and stating that it was adopting the "staple article of com-
merce" doctrine, which presumably is another term for the implied con-
certed conduct theory.' 73 However, the majority then held Betamax was
a staple because a significant quantity of home copying was privileged
under the fair use doctrine. By taking this course, the majority never
directly reached the issue of whether Sony, on the basis of constructive
knowledge of the use of its recorders by owners, should be held respon-
sible for copyright infringement in general, 174 that is, in the sense of not
being referenced to specific copyrights.
Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1982)) or protection is sought for an unregistered configuration.
See Oddi, supra note 165, discussing "functionality" (utilitarian and aesthetic) and "secondary mean-
ing" in product simulation cases.
168 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
169 See infra text accompanying notes 194-206.
170 This was well illustrated by Justice Holmes in terms of the simulator's intent:
But the label or ornament.., would not exist at all, or at least would not exist in that shape
but for the intent to deceive; whereas the instrument sold is made as it is, partly at least,
because of a supposed or established desire of the public for instruments in that form. The
defendant has the right to get the benefit of that desire even if created by the plaintiff. The
only thing it has not the right to steal is the good will attaching to the plaintiff's personality,
the benefit of the public's desire to have goods made by the plaintiff.
Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901).
171 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
172 One of the problems that probably has interfered with a clearer understanding of the underly-
ing theory of liability has been the failure in copyright law to distinguish vicarious liability from other
forms of multi-party liability. See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 12:04, including various theories
of multi-party liability under the label "Related Defendants and Vicarious Liability."
173 As discussed supra, text accompanying notes 148-51, the underlying theory of implied con-
certed conduct is to imply intent to act in concert to infringe by the sale of an article which has no
significant use but to infringe.
174 While not directly dealing with this issue, the majority did express its concern that imposition
ofliability on such a theory would be "extraordinary" if it were to enable the two respondents in this
case to have the "exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be used to infringe
copyrights." 464 U.S. at 441 n.221. With respect to the "authorized time-shifting," the Court
stated: "The exact percentage [of the total spectrum of television programming] is not specified, but
it is well below 10%. If [respondents] were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a
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Finding liability on the basis of constructive knowledge of the fore-
seeability of copyright infringement by purchasers is broader than that
which would be permissible in patent law, where, under the Aro 1I knowl-
edge requirement, the accused contributory infringer must know that the
nonstaple sold was to be used in infringing a specific patent.' 75 More-
over, constructive knowledge of general infringement is broader than the
general tort theory under section 876(b), which requires actual knowl-
edge of a breach of duty by the direct tortfeasor and encouragement or
assistance toward the end of consummating that breach. 76 It seems
highly unlikely that the mere sale of copy equipment would provide the
seller with actual knowledge of a breach of duty owed to the owner of a
particular copyright. To find liability based on constructive knowledge
would place the seller under a general duty with respect to all copyright
owners whose works are subject to copying by the equipment in ques-
tion. The breach of that duty would presumably be enforceable by any
copyright owner within the subject class. 177
The minority in Betamax evidently would go so far as to impose lia-
bility on Sony based upon the constructive knowledge of substantial in-
fringing use of copyrights in general. From the observation that off-the-
air recording is not only a foreseeable but the intended use of the
Betamax, the minority concluded that Sony had "induced and materially
contributed to the infringing conduct of Betamax owners."' 178 From this
it is not clear whether Justice Blackmun applied an induced conduct the-
ory or an expanded version of implied concerted conduct theory. Be-
cause neither patent law, trademark nor general tort theory has gone so
far as to impose liability on an implied concerted conduct theory short of
knowledge of the specific patent or trademark being infringed or duty
being breached, an investigation of the induced conduct theory may pro-
vide some insight.179
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of the remaining 90% of the programming
in the Nation." Id. at 443 (footnote omitted).
175 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964). See supra note
154.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
177 See infra text accompanying notes 250-72 for a discussion of the duty issue. Professor Nimmer
states: "Absence of knowledge that the activity constitutes copyright infringement does not absolve
the contributory infringer from liability, although it may affect the remedies available." 3 M. NiM-
MER, supra note 4, § 12.04[A] (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Scorpio Music Distrib., 569 F.
Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983)). However, it is submitted that this conclusion goes well beyond the facts
and holding in the case, where defendant alleged that it was not an infringer under 17 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) because it was not the importer and the court found that it was "undisputed that Scorpio
ordered the records with full knowledge of the importation problem." 569 F. Supp. at 48. More-
over, the court in Scorpio cites the Ninth Circuit decision, Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), for the proposition that "actual
knowledge" is not required. 569 F. Supp. at 48 n.5.
178 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 490 (1984) (footnote omitted).
179 The issue of knowledge may often be moot because an accused contributory infringer may be




According to section 877(a) of the Restatement,' 80 inducing tortious
conduct in either an active' 81 or, in certain circumstances, a passive man-
ner18 2 results in liability being imposed within the negligence standard of
due care. Section 877(a) imposes liability on an inducing tortfeasor who
"orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or should know of circum-
stances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own."' 8 3
Contrary to the general principle of section 877(a), it has been gen-
erally held in patent law that inducing infringement is limited to inten-
tional conduct requiring the actor to have actual knowledge of the patent
whose infringement is induced.' 8 4 Indeed, the patent statute limits lia-
bility for inducement to "active" inducement.'8 5
180 Section 877(a) subjects a person to liability if he:
(a) orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would
make the conduct tortious if it were his own, or
(b) conducts an activity with the aid of the other and is negligent in employing him, or
(c) permits the other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or
having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously, or
(d) controls, or has a duty to use care to control, the conduct of the other, who is likely to
do harm if not controlled, and fails to exercise care in the control, or
(e) has a duty to provide protection for, or to have care used for the protection of, third
persons or their property and confides the performance of the duty to the other, who causes
or fails to avert the harm by failing to perform.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877 (1979).
181 See id. § 877(a) ("orders or induces the conduct.").
182 See id § 877(c) ("permits the other to act"). Cf id § 877(d) ("controls, or has a duty to con-
trol"). There are a few patent cases involving the permitted use of premises or instrumentalities
which could be thought of as passive inducement under section 877(c); see, e.g., Duplex Envelope Co.
v. Denominational Envelope Co., 80 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1935) (defendant permitted its premises to
be used for the manufacture of infringing machines, but escaped liability on the ground that knowl-
edge of the infringement would not be imputed to it); Salvage Process Co. v. James Shewan & Sons,
26 F.2d 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1928) (contracting for another to clean a ship with infringing apparatus did
not constitute contributory infringement). If actual knowledge of the use of the premises or instru-
mentalities is required, any active versus passive distinction would appear moot. In copyright law,
the so-called "dance hall cases" (e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); Dreamland Ballroom v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36
F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929)) and the so-called "landlord-tenant case" (e.g., Deutch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1938)) are both examples of section 877(c) cases, requiring the party permitting use to
use due care to insure that direct infringement does not occur on those premises. However, the
majority in Betamax, categorized the "dance hall cases" as § 877(d) cases requiring that the actor
have a duty to control, 464 U.S. at 436 n.18, finding that Sony did not fall in that category in not
having any direct contact with users. Id. at 437-38. Cf the dissent's interpretation that the "dance
hall cases" charge the proprietors with constructive knowledge (id. at 488) and finding that the ma-
jority's attempt to distinguish these cases on the basis of "control" to be "obviously unpersuasive."
(id. at 488 n.39).
183 The tortious conduct would thus be to order or induce, and the theory of liability would be
negligence.
184 See 4 D. CmsuM, supra note 1, § 17:04; CPI/US, supra note 1, at 181-82. See generally, Miller,
Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 86 (1971).
185 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (Supp. IV 1986). As interpreted by the Fifth Circuit in Fromberg, Inc.
v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963):
The prohibition of law, now codified in § 271(b) extends to those who induce that
infringement. Of course, inducement has connotations of active steps knowingly taken-
knowingly at least in the sense of purposeful, intentional, as distinguished from accidental
or inadvertent. But with that qualifying approach, the term is as broad as the range of
actions by which one in fact causes, or urges, or encourages, or aids another to infringe a
patent.
Id. at 411. If "active" is to have its normal meaning, this may well exclude liability on the basis of the
passive "permissive" conduct of Clause (c) of§ 877 or the "failure to act" type of Clause (d). In any
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The range of actions that may constitute active inducement, how-
ever, seems only to be limited by the ingenuity of counsel. 18 6 Probably,
the most frequent class of active inducement cases would involve the sale
of an article along with instructions for using it to directly infringe a pat-
ented invention. 187 Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. 188 is an ex-
ample of this. In Dawson, the defendant sold the unpatented chemical
"propanil" along with instructions for its use according to the patented
process.' 89 Because propanil was a nonstaple, section 271(c) was appli-
cable; however, defendant was also ultimately held liable for active in-
ducement under section 271(b).1 90 The article sold need not, of course,
be a nonstaple; a seller of a staple could equally well actively induce the
infringement of a patent.' 9 ' The problem that arises, however, when a
staple is involved is whether or not the patent owner may be guilty of
misuse that would preclude the enforcement of the patent. 92
event, it is not apparent that patent law would impose a duty to police premises or instrumentalities
or to control beyond actual knowledge.
186 The open-ended nature of this tort was recognized early in its development, as stated by
Judge Lowell in Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O'Brien, 93 F. 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898):
In a sense, a trespass is aided if the trespasser is fed during the trespass. Yet it can
hardly be contended that an infringer's cook is liable as a contributory infringer. Probably
she would not be liable even if she knew of her master's wrongdoing. Again, no aid is more
potent than money. Is one who lends money to an infringer liable as co-infringer? Many
patents cannot be infringed without a building in which to construct the infringing device.
Is the landlord who lets a building to an infringer liable as co-infringer?
Id. at 202-03.
Other perhaps extreme examples include enjoining a shipper from transporting infringing de-
vices, Cotton-Tie Supply Co. v. McCready, I F. Cas. 631 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 295), and an
attempt to hold an electric company liable for supplying electricity that was used by a subscriber to
infringe a patent. Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Peninsular Light, Power & Heat Co., 101 F. 331 (6th Cir.
1900) (the attempt failed). See also CPI/US, supra note 1, at 187-88, for other and more recent
examples.
187 See, e.g., Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 467 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965
(1973); Trice Prods. Corp. v. Apco-Mossberg Corp., 45 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1930); Larkin Automotive
Parts Co. v. Bassick Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1927); Saf-Gard Prods., Inc. v. Service Parts,
Inc., 370 F. Supp. 257 (D. Ariz. 1973) (in addition to sale with instruction, acts included advertising
and promotion and aiding in resale), aff'd, 532 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 896
(1976). Another example would be the sale of the unassembled invention, such as in kit form, again
typically along with instructions for the assembly of the invention; see, e.g., Metal Arts Co. v. Fuller
Co., 389 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1968). The inducing infringer need not actually sell the article used in
infringement to be held liable. The inducing conduct may, for instance, involve advertising or solic-
iting the sale of the component for use in infringing the patent. Other situations which would not
necessarily involve a sale would be the design of a system on a contractual basis by one (inducing
infringer) for the use of the other (direct infringer), where the design provided turns out to infringe
the patent. Also, inducing infringement could be found in the installation of such a design thereby
inducing the infringement by the owner of the installation by using the design. Active inducement of
infringement has also been found in licensing situations, e.g., it would be active inducement of in-
fringement to license a patent, where the licensor either did not own or did not have authority to
sublicense, resulting in its licensee directly infringing the patent in question. Also active inducement
may be held against one who provides an indemnification against infringement of a patent to en-
courage the indemnitee to engage in infringing activity. Active inducement may also be found by
urging one to use an infringing process to produce a nonpatented article to be purchased by the
inducer. These various types of inducement are discussed and citations given in CPI/US, supra note
1, at 183-88.
188 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
189 Id.
190 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 789, 814-15 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
191 See supra note 184.
192 For a discussion of the misuse doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
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Trademark law has not as clearly limited liability for inducing con-
duct as has patent law. First, there is no statutory definition limiting in-
ducement to active inducement. Second, there continues to be a great
deal of confusion as to whether inducing infringement is limited to inten-
tional conduct as in patent law or whether a negligence standard may be
applied as recognized in tort law. This issue supposedly had been de-
cided in Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories. 1 93 In Ives, a six-justice ma-
jority expressly denied that it was approving a negligence standard for
contributory trademark infringement as was asserted to be the case by
Justice White in his concurring opinion.1 94 However, in Betamax, four
Justices appeared to be convinced that the trademark standard was-or
at least should be-a negligence standard, which also should be the gov-
erning standard applied in copyright law.195
In Ives, defendants were marketing the generic version (cyclande-
late) of plaintiff's trademarked pharmaceutical ("CYCLOSPASMOL")
after plaintiff's patent had expired. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that de-
fendants were guilty of contributory infringement of its trademark by
193 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
194 As stated by justice O'Connor for the majority in a footnote:
Justice White, in his opinion concurring in the result, voices his concern that we may
have "silently acquiesce[d] in a significant change in the test for contributory infringe-
ment." ... His concern derives from his perception that the Court of Appeals abandoned
the standard enunciated by Judge Friendly in its first opinion, a standard which both we and
Justice White approve.... The Court of Appeals, however, expressly premised its second
opinion on "the governing legal principles.., set forth in Judge Friendly's opinion upon
the earlier appeal . . ." and explicitly claimed to have rendered its second decision by
"[aipplying those principles .... Justice White's concern is based on a comment by the
Court of Appeals that the generic manufacturers "could reasonably anticipate" illegal sub-
stitution of their drugs.
Id at 854-55 n.13. justice Marshall joined justice White's concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist
concurred only in result based upon the failure of the court of appeals applying the "clearly errone-
ous" standard.
195 Justice Blackmun stated:
In an analogous case decided just two Terms ago, this Court approved a lower court's
conclusion that liability for contributory trademark infringement could be imposed on a
manufacturer who "suggested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufacturer's
goods to infringe the trademark of another. [citing Ives] I think this standard is equally
appropriate in the copyright context.
Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 489 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). justice Blackmun was joined in the dissent by Justices Marshall, Powell and Rehn-
quist. The majority in Betamax would appear to take an even more limited view of the standard for
contributory trademark infringement approved in Ives. In reference to the Ives case, justice Stevens
stated:
There we observed that a manufacturer or distributor could be held liable to the owner of a
trademark if it intentionally induced a merchant down the chain of distribution to pass off
its product as that of the trademark owner's or if it continued to supply a product which
could readily be passed off to a particular merchant whom it knew was mislabeling the
product with the trademark owner's mark. If Inwood's narrow standard for contributory
trademark infringement governed here, respondents' claim of contributory infringement
would merit little discussion. Sony certainly does not "intentionally induc[e]" its customers
to make infringing uses of respondents' copyrights, nor does it supply its products to iden-
tified individuals known by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of respondents'
copyrights.
Id. at 439 n.19 (citations omitted). However, the majority in Ives approved the "suggested, even if
only by implication" standard, which could be proven by the quantum of direct infringement. 456
U.S. at 853-54. See also CPI, supra note I, at 646-47. It is interesting to note that Justices Blackmun
and Powell joined in the majority opinion in Ives denying a negligence standard was being adopted
and justice Marshall joined in justice White's opinion warning of such a result.
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selling capsules of the same color and the same dosage to pharmacists
who then would apply the plaintiff's trademark upon receiving a pre-
scription for the trademarked brand. 96 In short, the pharmacists were
"passing off" the generic capsules for plaintiff's and were directly in-
fringing plaintiff's trademark by affixing its trademark to defendants'
look-a-like capsules. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the sale of the look-a-like
capsules as contributory infringement-more specifically here, inducing
infringement.
If defendants were selling labels bearing plaintiff's trademark for af-
fixation to goods, the implied concerted conduct theory and section
32(l)(b) of the Lanham Act197 would be directly applicable. Ives is the
converse situation, however, where the look-a-like product was supplied
and the accused direct infringer supplied and applied the trademark of
another. The nonstaple character of labels bearing the trademark would
justify implying contributory infringement on the part of the label sup-
plier. On the other hand, the look-a-like capsules were technically capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses. They could be prescribed by a
physician by their generic name and accordingly filled by the pharma-
cists. Moreover, under applicable state law pharmacists were permitted
to substitute the approved generic version of the prescribed trademarked
drug if the physician signed over the appropriate "substitution permissi-
ble" line on the prescription form. '9 8 Thus, there was a significant, legit-
imate market for the look-a-like capsules outside of use with plaintiff's
trademark affixed. Nonetheless, the availability of the look-a-like cap-
sules did provide pharmacists with the opportunity to make the substitu-
tion of the lower priced generic for the higher priced trademarked brand
and to pocket the difference by charging the higher brand price.
After two appeals to the Second Circuit, 199 the Supreme Court re-
versed for failure to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard to the district
196 Defendants in Ives were also charged with violating section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a), and unfair competition under New York law. 456 U.S. at 849. The contributory
infringement count brought under section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a), was
reversed by the Supreme Court for failure to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard; the other
counts were remanded to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard. These counts were also subse-
quently dismissed. Ives Laboratories v. Inwood Laboratories, 24 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 538 (2d Cir. 1982).
197 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a) (1982). See supra note 28 for the text accompanying this provision.
198 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6810(6)(a) (McKinney 1972 and Supp. 1982-83).
199 The district court, Ives Laboratories v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(Ives I), held against the plaintiff trademark owners and was affirmed by the Second Circuit, 601 F.2d
631 (2d Cir. 1979) (Ives H), on the basis that the lower court was justified in concluding that Ives
failed to adduce the quantum of proof necessary for a temporary injunction even though the lower
court's standard was unduly narrow. The Second Circuit held that the "suggested, even if only by
implication" standard should apply. Id. at 636. On remand the district court, 488 F. Supp. 394
(E.D.N.Y 1980) (Ives III), in applying the Ives II "suggested, even if only by implication" standard
again found against plaintiff. However, plaintiff was finally successful in the second appeal to the
Second Circuit, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981) (Ives IV), which held that defendants by selling the look-
a-like capsules could reasonably anticipate that their product would be illegally substituted by a
substantial number of druggists who would apply the infringing trademark. The court concluded
"[tihis amounted to a suggestion, at least by implication, that the druggists take advantage of the
opportunity to engage in such misconduct." Id. at 543.
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court's application of the standard for contributory infringement estab-
lished in the first appeal. 200 This standard was:
[T]hat a manufacturer or wholesaler would be liable under § 32 if he
suggested, even if only by implication, that a retailer fill a bottle with
the generic capsules and apply Ives' mark to the label, or continued to
sell capsules containing the generic drug which facilitated this to a
druggist whom he knew or had reason to know was engaging in the
practices just described.20 1
The Supreme Court approved this standard, although it somewhat con-
fusingly equated "suggested, even if only by implication" with "inten-
tionally induced. ' 20 2 Moreover, the Court seemingly approved the
drawing of an inference of "suggestion" on the basis of the quantity of
mislabeling proven; although in this case, it was not "dearly erroneous"
for the district court not to draw the inference on proving only a "few
instances" of mislabeling.
20 3
In any event, the standard approved in Ives is significantly broader
than that applied in patent law. The "suggested, even if only by implica-
tion" standard, though disclaimed as a negligence standard, may be es-
tablished by less than personal, active inducement by the supplier of the
simulated product. Evidently, all that is required is that a substantial
number of pharmacists commit direct infringement by substituting the
generic capsules for plaintiff's while applying the latter's trademark. 20 4
This form of analysis and result resembles Betamax, particularly where
the dissent extended it to impose liability on the seller of copy technol-
ogy, provided the copyright owner can prove significant direct infringe-
ment. As in Ives, no personal nexus is required with the purchaser
beyond marketing the article used in the infringement. The minority
view in Betamax is broader than Ives, for copyright infringement in gen-
eral need only be proved, not infringement of specific copyrights. At
least in Ives, the generic suppliers were well aware of the specific trade-
mark they were alleged to have contributorily infringed.
200 Ives Laboratories v. Inwood Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
201 Ives II, 601 F.2d at 636.
202 The Court stated:
Thus, ifa manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark,
or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially
[sic] responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.
456 U.S. at 854 (footnotes omitted). In footnote 13 to this quotation, which is quoted in full supra
note 194,Justice O'Connor commented with respect to the Ives 11 standard quoted supra text accom-
panying note 201 that this was "a standard which both we and Justice White approve." Id. at 854
n.13. Adding to the confusion, the Court later in the Ives opinion again used the "intentionally
induced" language but dropped the alternate basis of liability that the seller "had reason to know"
limiting it to those who they "knew were mislabeling." Id. at 855.
203 The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals cited no evidence to support its conclusion, which apparently
rests upon the assumption that a pharmacist who has been provided an imitative generic
drug will be unable to resist the temptation to profit from illegal activity. We find no sup-
port in the record for such a far-reaching conclusion. Moreover, the assumption is inconsis-
tent with the District Court's finding that only a "few instances," rather than a substantial
number, of mislabelings occurred. 488 F. Supp. at 397.
456 U.S. at 856 n.17.
204 See CTI, supra note 1, at 646-47, for further elaboration on this point.
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The majority in Betamax expressly required a personal nexus for in-
ducement. 20 5 The majority used a fair use analysis to determine the
quantum of direct infringement by analyzing why Betamax owners used
them. The majority analysis implies that, had the evidence been more
convincing that users were copying off-the-air works for "librarying"
rather than for "time shifting," the result would have been different. If
contributory infringement (specifically, inducing infringement) can be
shown by establishing that purchasers are engaged in direct infringement
to whatever quantum necessary, this would be tantamount to imposing a
negligence standard on the seller of the product used in the infringe-
ment. The quantity of direct infringement by purchasers should "sug-
gest" to a reasonable seller that direct infringement was occurring as a
result of those sales to the particular direct infringers. The higher the
amount of direct infringement, the more suggestive it would be to a rea-
sonable seller. 20 6
C. Misuse of Intellectual Property
The doctrine of misuse also bears upon the scope of contributory
infringement. Tort theory, as applied in intellectual property, is gener-
ally circumscribed because of the "Nation's historical antipathy to mo-
nopoly" 20 7 and the constitutional mandate that the protection afforded
for limited time be to promote science and the useful arts. 20 8 In this
sense, intellectual property, rather than being treated as property qua
property, is categorized in legal theory as a "privilege." 20 9 In terms of
public policy, it has been deemed to be inequitable conduct (i.e. misuse)
for the owner of intellectual property to attempt to extend its protection
beyond the bounds of the governmental grant, thus rendering the grant
unenforceable. 210 The doctrines of contributory infringement and mis-
205 See supra note 195.
206 Another aspect of Ives that provides a broader scope of protection for trademark owners than
for patent owners is with respect to the duty imposed upon the seller of simulated products to act
with due care to police its purchasers to ascertain whether or not they are engaging in illegal substi-
tutions. As quoted supra text accompanying note 201, the Ives II standard, as reiterated by the
Supreme Court, would impose liability if the supplier continues to supply the product to one who it
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement. This without question is a
negligence standard that comports fully with section 877 of the Restatement. However, it is contrary
to patent law that the seller of a staple is not under any duty of due care to determine whether its
purchasers are using it to infringe a patent. Even with regard to the sale of a nonstaple, the seller
must have actual knowledge of the particular patent being infringed through the use of the
nonstaple.
207 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972).
208 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, quoted supra note 17. As stated in Graham v.John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5 (1966): "The clause [U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8] is both a grant of power and a limitation.
This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts.' "
209 As stated by Justice Douglas: "The patent is a privilege. But it is a privilege which is condi-
tioned by a public purpose." Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid 1), 320 U.S. 661,666
(1944).
210 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942):
Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent by declining to
entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the
improper practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the




use (at least as applied in patent law) are said to "rest on antithetical
underpinnings. " 21 ' A brief review of the history of the ascent of patent
misuse and the decline of contributory patent infringement may be help-
ful at this point. 21 2
After contributory infringement was recognized in Wallace v.
Holmes 213 it did not take long for patent owners to realize the potency of
the doctrine of contributory infringement as a means for optimally ex-
ploiting their patents. In part, such exploitation was undertaken through
"tie-in" arrangements, where permission to use a patented invention was
"tied" to the purchase of unpatented materials. The rationale underly-
ing tie-ins and enforcement against competing sellers of the materials by
means of an action for contributory infringement was set out in Heaton-
Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. (Button-Fastener case).
Button-Fastener held that because a patent was property, its owner should
be able to prescribe conditions for its use.214 In 1912, this property logic
was approved by the Supreme Court in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. ,215 which
set the high-water mark of contributory infringement. However, Henry
was repudiated just five years later in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Manufacturing Co. ,216 where the Court held that a patent was unen-
forceable because such "tie-ins" were "wholly without the scope and
purpose of our patent laws and because, if sustained, it would be gravely
injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more a favorite of
the law than is the promotion of private fortunes." 21 7 The Court did not
address the issue of whether the patent owner's conduct violated anti-
211 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 197 (1980) (quoting Rohm & Haas
Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685, 697 (5th Cir. 1979)).
212 For a more complete treatment of this history, see id, at 187-99; CPIIUS, supra note 1, at 203-
07.
213 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100), discussed supra text accompanying notes 148-
49.
214 77 F. 288, 291-93 (6th Cir. 1896). Hence, one who was licensed to use the patented invention
on the condition that an unpatented material was purchased from the patent owner became a direct
infringer if it should purchase this unpatented material from an unauthorized supplier. Such a sup-
plier of the unpatented material would be a contributory infringer provided, at least, that it had
knowledge of the limitation of the licensed use of the patented invention. In Cortelyou v. Charles
Eneu Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196 (1907), the Supreme Court refused to hold liable the seller of
materials to owners of a patented machine where a restriction had been placed on the owners requir-
ing them to purchase materials only from the patent owner, because it had not been shown that the
seller had adequate notice of the restriction.
215 224 U.S. 1 (1912). The tying of the use of a patented mimeograph machine to the purchase of
unpatented ink used with the machine was permissible, and anyone selling ink to a user of the
machine with knowledge of the condition was a contributory infringer. Id. at 49.
216 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (involving the tie-in of films for the use of a patented film feeder in a
motion picture projector). In dissent, Justice Holmes asserted the primacy of property logic in
stating:
Generally speaking the measure of a condition is the consequence of a breach, and if that
consequence is one that the owner may impose unconditionally, he may impose it condi-
tionally upon a certain event.... But the domination [over unpatented articles] is one only
'to the extent of the desire for the tea pot or film feeder, and if the owner prefers to keep the
pot or the feeder unless you will buy his tea or films, I cannot see in allowing him the right
to do so anything more than an ordinary incident of ownership ....
Id. at 519-20 (citations omitted).
217 Id. (citation omitted) (majority).
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trust law, particularly the newly enacted Clayton Act proscribing tie-
ins.
2 1 8
In the years following Motion Picture, the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement was gradually eroded. In both Henry and Motion Picture the
"tied" unpatentable material had not been a part of the claimed inven-
tion. Misuse was then extended to the situation when a patent owner
expressly,2 19 or even impliedly, 220 licensed the use of its patented inven-
tion only upon the purchase from it of unpatented materials used in the
invention. A finding of misuse did not invalidate the patent but rendered
it unenforceable against any type of infringement-direct, induced or
contributory-until the misuse has been purged.22'
The most damaging blow to contributory infringement came in the
controversial Mercoid cases, 222 in which the Supreme Court held that it
was patent misuse for patent owners to derive revenues from licensing an
admitted nonstaple-a special switch whose only function was in a pat-
ented heating system. Many thought this applied the coup de grace when
Justice Douglas went so far to say: "The result of this decision together
with those that have preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of
contributory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop
to consider." 223
Over the ensuing years considerable pressure was applied, especially
by the patent bar, 2 2 4 for the reversal of Mercoid through legislative action.
This was achieved by the codification of section 271(c) and (d) of the
218 Id. at 517. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, and § 3 (15 U.S.C. § 14)
had been relied upon by the Court of Appeals in the Motion Picture case. The Supreme Court, while
not relying upon it, found the Clayton Act to be a "most persuasive expression of public policy." Id.
See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST Pt. C (1977), for consideration of the antitrust aspects of tying
arrangements.
219 In Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931), a patent cover-
ing a container in which dry ice was disposed was held unenforceable against a seller of dry ice when
the patent owner expressly licensed use of the container upon the purchase of dry ice from it.
220 In Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), a patent covering a process using a
bituminus material was held to be unenforceable, where the owner of the patent only granted im-
plied licenses for the use of the patented method when the material was purchased from it.
221 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (The requirement that the user of
a patented machine purchase salt tablets from the patent owner rendered the patent unenforceable
against an alleged direct infringer of the machine.). In B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942),
where the patent owner granted implied licenses only to those who purchased from it pre-cut strips
for use in its patented process for making shoes, the patent was held enforceable against a defendant
who allegedly contributorily infringed by selling such strips and also induced infringement of the
plaintiff's patent. The Court deemed it inappropriate at that time to consider whether the misuse
had been purged by the offer of an unconditional license to users of the process. Id. at 498.
222 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co. (Mercoid 11), 320 U.S. 680 (1944). See Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 195-215 (1980) for a discussion of the Mercoid cases and this
aftermath leading to the enactment of section 271 of the Patent Act.
223 Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 669.
224 See, e.g., Patent Law Codification and Revision, 1951: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Contributory Infringement in Patents and
Definition of Invention, 1948: Hearings on H.R. 5988, 4061, 5248 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks and Copyrights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); Contributory In-
fringement, 1949: Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1948).
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Patent Act in 1952.225 It was not, however, until thirty years later in Daw-
son Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. 226 that the Supreme Court inter-
preted these provisions, finding that: "[B]y enacting §§ 271(c) and (d),
Congress granted to patent holders a statutory right to control nonstaple
goods that are capable only of infringing use in a patented invention and
that are essential to that invention's advance over prior art."' 227 The
Court concluded that the patent owner did not misuse its patent by only
impliedly licensing those who purchased the unpatented chemical
propanil, whose only known use was in the patented process and hence
was an "essential nonstaple," nor by refusing to license competitors to
sell the propanil. The Court, perhaps ironically, applied a "reverse"
property logic in inferring the right to refuse to license from the right to
license free of patent misuse as expressly authorized in section
271(d)(2).228
To whatever extent Dawson may have weakened the misuse doctrine,
the supposed concomitant of strengthening contributory infringement
may not have resulted. If a nonstaple must be an "essential nonstaple,"
i.e., "essential to that invention's advance over the prior art," to qualify
under section 271 (c), contributory patent infringement may be a severely
restricted tort.229 Moreover, Dawson may give some pause in this regard
in holding that section 271(d) relates only to contributory infringement
under section 271(c). Thus it would appear that induced infringement
under section 271(b) would not be similarly protected against misuse
even with respect to conduct specifically exempted from misuse under
section 271(d) with respect to section 271(c) contributory
infringement. 230
By recently enacted legislation, 23' section 271 (d) has been amended
to add two further exceptions to patent misuse, namely refusing to li-
cense a patent and tying the licensing of a patent or sale of a patented
product to the license of another patent or sale of another product, un-
less the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
tied patent or patented product.23 2 Even with such further limitations on
225 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)-(d) (1982). Section 271(c) is quoted supra note 145. Section 271(d)
provides:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue
from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if per-
formed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1982).
226 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
227 Id. at 213.
228 Ironic in the sense that the property logic ofJustice Holmes in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1917) had been rejected in that case, while in Dawson
the privilege to license free of misuse was held to imply the right not to license. See CPI, supra note 1,
at 116-26, for further explication of the rationale of Dawson on this issue.
229 See CPI, supra note 1, at 86 n.48, 93-95, 127.
230 See id. at 105-08.
231 Act approved Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674. See 37 Pat. Trademark &
CopyrightJ. (BNA) 88 (1988).
232 Under the amendment, § 271(d) is changed as follows:
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the misuse doctrine, the sale of a nonstaple (presumably an "essential"
nonstaple within the Dawson formulation) would be required for a finding
of contributory infringement under section 271(c), thus incorporating a
significant portion of the misuse doctrine as developed over the last sev-
enty years. Moreover, this amendment does not address the question of
what conduct is exempted from patent misuse when the claim is for ac-
tive inducement under section 271 (b).233
In contrast to patent law, the misuse doctrine has not had significant
impact in limiting the scope of protection under contributory infringe-
ment in both trademark and copyright law. The Supreme Court has
never directly ruled on the contributory infringement/misuse issue in
trademark or copyright law. According to what precedent there is, it
would appear likely that at least a separate antitrust violation must be
found with respect to the use of the trademarks or copyrights as an ele-
ment of a misuse defense. 234 The proposed amendment to section 271
of the Patent Act would limit the impact of misuse along this same line.
Nonetheless, the consequence of expanding contributory infringement
to preclude the sale of products not falling within the scope of the patent,
trademark or copyright in question could have very similar competitive
consequences, irrespective of the type of intellectual property involved.
In Dawson the doctrine of contributory infringement of the patent
was extended to encompass the unpatented chemical propanil and en-
joined its unauthorized sale. Had the trademark owner in Ives been able
to prove "substantial" direct infringement by pharmacists, presumably it
would have been granted an injunction against the sale of look-alike cap-
sules containing an unpatented pharmaceutical on the basis of contribu-
tory infringement. The competitive consequences of extending a
monopoly to a chemical having no known use but in the patented inven-
tion or to the color of capsules would seem to pale in comparison to the
potential consequences of holding for the Studios in Betamax. Had the
Studios prevailed, whether an injunction or a "lesser" remedy were
Section 271 (d) of title 35, United States Code, is amended by striking out the period at the
end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(4) refused to license or use any
rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of
the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase
of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale
is conditioned."
36 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. 778 (1988).
233 See CPI, supra note I, at 105-08.
234 There appears to be a question whether an antitrust violation would bar the enforcement of
copyright. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13:09[A]. See also Fire, Misuse and Antitrust Defenses to
Copyright Infringement Actions, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 315 (1965); Lewis, The Defense of Misuse in Copyrights
Actions, 41 DENVER L.J. 30 (1964); Note, The Misuse Defense in Copyright Actions, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 916
(1962); CTI, supra note 1, at 618 n.101.
In trademark law an antitrust violation directly involving a trademark appears to be a pre-condi-
tion for the unenforceability of the trademark. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 31:24. E.g., in Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aft'd, 433 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971), the court stated: "An essential element of the
antitrust misuse defense in a trademark case is proof that the mark itself has been the basic and
fundamental vehicle required and used to accomplish the violation." See also Lanham Act § 33(b)(7),
15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(7) (1982), recognizing an antitrust violation as a defense to the incontestability
of a registered mark.
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granted, the market for VCR's would be subject to control by copyright
owners, with the developers of VCR's being required to buy access from
copyright owners to that market. Of course, the added costs of access
would, as far as possible, be passed on to purchasers of VCR's.
If user capability is to be the standard for contributory copyright in-
fringement and if any copyright owner whose works are subject to copy-
ing by particular technology has standing to assert it against sellers of
such copy technology, a serious question is raised as to whether the doc-
trine of contributory infringement is being applied in a manner to pro-
tect the public interest in free competition, which presumably is still
"more a favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes." 23 5
This is not to suggest that the doctrine of misuse should be indiscrimi-
nately applied to copyright owners, in particular for merely filing an ac-
tion for contributory infringement.23 6 On the other hand, some
consideration should be given to the consequences of adopting an overly
broad standard for contributory infringement for fear of permitting the
anticompetitive consequences that the equitable doctrine of misuse was
created to avoid. After all, the straw that broke the camel's back of con-
tributory patent infringement was the tie-in requirement of the acquisi-
tion of films from the patent owner in order to use its patented invention.
There is perhaps a sardonic analogy that can be drawn between Mo-
tion Picture and Betamax, which were decided almost 70 years apart. In
Motion Picture, the owner of patented technology (a film feeding device on
a movie projector) sought to control the market for visual works (re-
corded on film-the Copyright Act was amended in 1912 to include "mo-
tion pictures" as copyrightable subject matter237 ), which were to be
viewed with the technology. In Betamax, the owner of copyrighted works
(recorded on films and tapes) sought to control the market in technology
(VCR's-presumably patentable in whole or part) upon which its works
could be recorded and then viewed. In Motion Picture, the patent owner
relied upon contributory infringement against a supplier of films to be
viewed through the use of its invention of acquiring films with its authori-
zation. In Betamax, the copyright owners relied upon contributory in-
fringement against a supplier of VCR's to be used to copy and view its
copyrighted works, conditioning (impliedly) the use of its copyrighted
works on the acquisition of a VCR with its authorization. 238 The analogy
would seem to return us to the property logic of the Button-Fastener case
and Henry v. A.B. Dick that because a copyright is property, its owner
should be able to prescribe conditions for its use, e.g., being recorded
and played back only on VCR's authorized by the copyright owner.23 9
235 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917).
236 See Stroco Prods., Inc. v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 168 (S.D. Ca. 1944) (holding filing
of a contributory infringement action misuse) overruled legislatively by 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (1982).
237 See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488.
238 In both cases failure to obtain authorization from the intellectual property owner to supply
films or VCR's would have resulted in direct infringement by users of the patented invention or
copyrighted work, if not for the misuse doctrine in Motion Picture and the fair use doctrine in Betamax,
respectively.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 214-18 and Justice Holmes' statement of property logic,
supra note 216.
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D. Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine
This section will address the question of whether the "staple article
of commerce" doctrine, as employed in Betamax,240 provides a proper
"balance between a copyright owner's legitimate demand for effective-
not merely symbolic-protection of its statutory monopoly and the right
of others to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce." 24 1
The nature of the article being sold has played a significant role in defin-
ing the scope of contributory infringement, although the rationale sup-
porting that role has varied from time-to-time. If the article being sold
was a staple (i.e., capable of significant noninfringing uses), traditionally
such a sale in itself would not support an inference of intent to cause
another to infringe with the staple. On the other hand, if the article be-
ing sold was a nonstaple (capable of no substantial noninfringing uses
other than to infringe the intellectual property in question), then the sale
of such an article would give rise to an inference that infringement was
intended by the seller, for the nonstaple would have no market but for its
use in the infringement. 242 Later, the rationale became the public policy
in "free competition" that required free access to staple articles. Indeed,
at least insofar as patent law is concerned, it would be misuse to attempt
to extend the monopoly of the intellectual property grant to encompass
the staple article, but if the article was a nonstaple it fell within the pro-
tection of the patent grant and was protectable by means of the doctrine
of contributory infringement. 243 In sum, the categorization as a staple or
nonstaple, in patent law at least, started as an evidentiary device to infer
the intent of the seller; today, the categorization establishes the dividing
line between contributory infringement and misuse. Stated another way,
for there to be the tort of contributory infringement, in the strict sense, it
is necessary that a nonstaple article of commerce be involved. 244
Whether an article is classified as a nonstaple on the basis of its tech-
nical capability to be used in noninfringing ways or on the basis of how
much it was used in directly infringing bears directly on the scope of
protection afforded under an intellectual property grant. The primary
use by owners of an article may be to directly infringe, while the article
has other technical capabilities. The dichotomy between staples and
nonstaples has played a significant role in the trilogy of Supreme Court
contributory infringement cases. In Dawson and Betamax the categoriza-
240 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984); see also id. at 491
(Blackmun, J., dissenting): "I recognize, however, that many of the concerns underlying the 'staple
article of commerce' doctrine are present in copyright law as well."
241 Id. at 442.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
243 See supra text accompanying notes 216-28.
244 As stated in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980):
Section 271 (c) identifies the basic dividing line between contributory infringement and
patent misuse. It adopts a restrictive definition of contributory infringement that distin-
guishes between staple and nonstaple articles of commerce. It also defines the class of
nonstaple items narrowly. In essence, this provision places materials like the dry ice of the
Carbice case [283 U.S. 27 (1931)] outside the scope of the contributory infringement doc-
trine. As a result, it is no longer necessary to resort to the doctrine of patent misuse in




tion was critical-but for different reasons. In Ives the categorization was
not of central concern, but it appears to play the same role as it did in
Betamax.
In Dawson the logic of the Court is clear in first applying section
271(c) and then interpreting the effect of section 271(d) in immunizing
certain conduct of the patent owner from a misuse charge. For contribu-
tory infringement to be held under section 271(c), a nonstaple must be
sold. Moreover, to immunize conduct of the patent owner under section
271 (d), the nonstaple must then satisfy two requirements: (1) It must be
"capable only of infringing use in a patented invention," and (2) it must
be "essential to that invention's advance over prior art. ' 245 The determi-
nation of whether propanil was a nonstaple under these requirements
was objectively done on the basis of its technical capability. First, it had
only one known use, namely, in practicing the patented method; thus
purchasers had no choice if they desired to use propanil but to infringe
the patent. Second, propanil was essential to the advance over the prior
art for it was the only active ingredient in the method claimed. Having
made this determination, the Court then turned to section 271(d) to de-
termine to what extent this paragraph immunized the patent owner from
misuse. It held that the refusal to license others to sell the "essential
nonstaple" was not misuse for, if the patent owner could license under
section 271 (d) (2) free of patent misuse, it could also refuse to license. 246
The end result was to extend the patent monopoly to the unpatented
propanil.
The logic of Betamax in dealing with the staple/nonstaple dichotomy
is significantly different from that used in patent law, as evidenced by
Dawson, with which the majority states there is a "historic kinship." The
categorization of staple or nonstaple in Betamax is not undertaken to
draw the dividing line between contributory infringement and misuse but
rather went to the ultimate question of whether a tort-direct infringe-
ment-had been committed at all. Moreover, the dichotomy appears not
to have been made directly and objectively on the technical capability of
the article sold but rather derivatively and subjectively on the basis of fair
use by VCR owners. 247 This approach collapses two elements of the tort
into one. A determination of direct infringement (albeit in significant
quantity) is used not only to satisfy the sine qua non requirement of con-
tributory infringement but also to satisfy that the product being sold is a
nonstaple. This renders the dichotomy ineffectual as an independent
standard. There is no need to resort to it at all. Once intellectual prop-
erty owners fail to establish direct infringement, they cannot, by defini-
tion, establish contributory infringement. The nature of the article being
245 l at 213.
246 For the argument that this is "reverse property logic," see supra note 228.
247 Purchasers ofpropanil had no option: Either they used it to practice the patented process or
they did not use it at all. On the other hand, purchasers of VCR's could use them to record copy-
righted or uncopyrighted works for time-shifting or library or even commercial purposes, e.g. selling
recorded video tapes. Whether or not there is contributory infringement is not determined on what
is being sold (VCR's) but rather on why it is being used, i.e. fair use and the quantum of direct
infringement.
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sold is irrelevant to whether direct infringement has been committed. Its
nature, however, should be important with respect to the public policy
supporting free competition in staples that have the capability to be used
in other than infringing ways, and hence whether the article sold is a
staple or nonstaple should be quite relevant to the issue of whether con-
tributory infringement should be held.
The approach of Betamax is more analogous to that of Ives than Daw-
son. In Ives "suggested, even if only by implication" was stated to be the
appropriate standard, but the ultimate test of contributory (induced) in-
fringement was the quantum of direct infringement.2 48 A personal nexus
between the seller and the direct infringer was not required. In Betamax
the requirement for an objective, qualitative determination of the techni-
cal capability of an article was eliminated. The torts of contributory
trademark and copyright infringement hence appear now to be collapsed
into a single element-the quantity of direct infringement resulting from
the sale of an article. Whatever the reason or reasons the majority had in
mind for applying and presumably adopting a user capability standard
and then embarking on fair use analysis, this standard appears to have, at
best, a mere passing acquaintance with the patent law standard rather
than any "historic kinship." Indeed, the kinship appears to be of recent
lineage rather than one of historic proportions; it would appear to have
been born in the Ives case, which Justice Blackmun indicated to be an
analogous case decided just two terms ago. 2 4 9
The logic of both Ives and Betamax is tantamount to placing a seller
of any article under a duty to protect trademark and copyright owners
against the commission of direct infringement by purchasers Cf such arti-
cles should such infringement reach "significant" proportions. The next
section will consider the duty requirements generally imposed in tort law
with respect to conduct that contributes to the commission of a tort.
E. Duty Owed to Intellectual Property Owners
Reviewing the approach of the Restatement is informative on the ques-
tion of the duty owed by one who contributes to the injury of another.
The Restatement rules with respect to concerted conduct (section 876)250
and independent concurring or consecutive conduct (section 879)251 are
specified to be specific applications of the general rule of section 875,252
defining the liability of "contributing tortfeasors." Both the general and
248 See supra text accompanying notes 203-04.
249 464 U.S. at 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
250 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979), quoted supra note 133.
251 Concurring or Consecutive Independent Acts
If the tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal cause of harm that cannot
be apportioned, each is subject to liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their
conduct is concurring or consecutive.
Id. § 879.
252 Contributing Tortfeasers-General Rule
Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and
indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire
harm.
Id. § 875; see id. comment a. Normal rules of causation between the contributory conduct and the
ultimate tort are required. Id. comment c.
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specific rules are also limited to situations where there is "indivisible
harm," which is clearly the case with respect to infringement of patents,
trademarks, or copyrights. The comment to section 875 makes it clear
that the application of the rules of sections 875, 876 and 879 includes
only situations "in which the defendant has been personally guilty of tor-
tious conduct." 253 To be "personally guilty of tortious conduct," the
contributing tortfeasor must, of course, be under a duty to the injured
party. With respect to "agreed concerted conduct" under section 876(a),
as previously discussed:25 4 "In order for the rule of clause (a) to be ap-
plicable, it is essential that the conduct of the actor be in itself tor-
tious.1'255 For it to be tortious the actor must have breached a duty owed
to the injured party.
Section 876(b) extends the duty of the actor not to give "substantial
assistance or encouragement" toward the commission of a tort by an-
other, provided the actor has actual knowledge that the encouraged or
assisted conduct constitutes a breach of duty to the third party.25 6 The
duty arises not from tortious conduct itself; rather, the conduct becomes
tortious from the knowledge of the breach of duty by the other. The
other party need not know that his act is tortious, but, for the assistant or
the encourager to be a tortfeasor, he must know that the other's conduct
is tortious.2 5
7
1. Separate Duty Concerted Conduct
The discussion of section 876(c) has been deferred to this point be-
cause of its particular requirement that a "separate duty" be owed by the
actor (contributing tortfeasor) to the injured third person. For liability
to be imposed under section 876(c), the contributing tortfeasor must
give "substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious re-
sult and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person." 258
The rule of section 876(c) differs from that of section 876(b) in sev-
eral respects. First, evidently "encouragement" alone would not violate
section 876(c); something more is required in the form of "assistance,"
presumably toward providing the means to commit the tort. Second, it is
necessary that providing such assistance constitute a breach of duty with
respect to the injured third person. If these conditions are satisfied, lia-
bility is imposed on the contributor "irrespective of his knowledge or
that his act or the act of the other is tortious." 25 9 As stated in the com-
ment to section 876(c): "[O]ne who supplied another with the means of
committing a tort is not liable if he has no reasons to suppose that a tort
will be committed." 260 This implies that the act of supplying an article to
253 Id. § 875 comment a.
254 See supra text accompanying notes 133-41.
255 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 comment c (1979).
256 See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
257 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 comment d, illustrations 7 and 8 (1979).
258 Id § 876(c). Section 876 is quoted in full supra note 133.
259 Id comment e (1979).
260 Id.
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another when the actor has reason to know of its use in committing a tort
would result in liability under this clause, i.e., a negligence standard.
Nonetheless, the clause makes clear that the actor's conduct, separately
considered, must constitute a breach of duty to the third person.261 Ob-
viously, the sine qua non of a breach of duty is the existence of a duty.
2. Concurring or Consecutive Conduct
Another section of the Restatement related to contributing tortfeasors
that may have relevance to the duty issue is section 879. Under section
879 a contributing tortfeasor engaging in independent, concurring or
consecutive conduct may be held liable for tortious conduct that is a
"legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned . . . irrespective of
whether the conduct is concurring or consecutive." 262 The comment to
this section provides: "It is . . . immaterial that the liability of one is
based upon common law rules while that of the other is based upon a
statute." 263 This may have particular applicability to intellectual prop-
erty, for example, in copyright law, where direct infringement is gov-
erned by statute,264 while contributory infringement is based upon
common law rules. 26 5 Moreover, contributory infringement may com-
monly be seen as "consecutive" conduct, where the article is being sold
by the actor and then used by its purchasers to directly infringe. None-
theless, under this rule, each of the parties must be guilty of tortious
conduct; thus each must owe a separate duty to the third person.
Accordingly, whether the rule of section 876(c) or section 879 ap-
plies in a contributory infringement situation, the question of whether a
duty is owed by the contributor to the intellectual property owners
should be examined. In the context of contributory infringement, the
issue might be phrased: Does the sale of an article technically capable of
noninfringing uses give rise to a duty to protect intellectual property
owners from infringement when the product is used to infringe?2 66
261 An illustration given in the Restatement under Section 876(c) is the sale of a defective handgun
with the seller reasonably believing that the purchaser would repair it prior to resale. If the pur-
chaser negligently fails to do so, liability would not be imposed upon the original seller of the defec-
tive handgun, presumably on the basis that the seller owed no duty to the third party because he had
a reasonable expectation that it would be repaired prior to reselling. See id. § 876 illustration 13. If
the seller had reason to know that the handgun would be resold without repair, a duty would pre-
sumably arise because of the creation of the unreasonable risk of injury to the third person upon the
handgun's being resold without repairs; hence, liability could be imposed under section 876(c).
Somewhat confusingly the Restatement gives the following illustration under section 876(b): "8. A
sells to B for resale a gun known by him to be dangerously defective. B negligently fails to examine
the gun before selling it to C, who is hurt while attempting to discharge it. A is subject to liability to
C." Id. illustration 8. It is not apparent how A would "know" that B would negligently fail to inspect
the gun. This illustration would seem to be better placed under clause (c), with a duty being im-
posed on A not to knowingly place in commerce a dangerously defective product without so advising
the purchaser B.
262 Id. § 879, quoted in full supra note 251.
263 Id. comment a.
264 See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982), quoted supra note 28.
265 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984).
266 The issue may be further refined: If there is such a duty, would it extend to intellectual prop-
erty owners in general or only to owners of specified intellectual property? See infra note 270 for
further analysis of the duty question.
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With respect to patent law, in view of the limited nature of section
271(c), as interpreted in Dawson and Aro II, the rules of Restatement sec-
tions 876(c) and 879 do not appear to be directly applicable. If a non-
staple were involved, then section 271(c) would provide whatever
remedy there may be. If a staple is involved, no separate duty would be
imposed on the seller for the protection of the patent owner in view of
the doctrine of patent misuse, except, perhaps, to refrain from actively
inducing infringement.2 67 In view of the patent misuse doctrine, one
would expect section 271(b) and (c) to preempt any common law tort
theory.
In trademark and copyright law, the issue is not so clear, as evi-
denced by Ives and Betamax. In Ives, the Court would appear to impose a
duty on a seller 'of look-alike capsules containing an unpatented pharma-
ceutical, which were capable of noninfringing uses, not to permit its cus-
tomers to commit direct trademark infringement in significant
amounts. 268 Moreover, the Court placed the seller under a duty to police
its customers and not to sell to those it knew or had reason to know were
infringing the subject trademark.2 69
Although there is some ambiguity in Betamax in regard to whether
the majority adopted a technical capability or a user capability standard,
there is no ambiguity that it applied the user capability standard by enter-
ing into the fair use analysis. Also it is clear that the minority would
adopt a user capability standard. In any event, with respect to the appli-
cation of the standard, a VCR seller would have a duty not to permit its
customers to commit direct infringement in significant amounts by using
their VCR's to record works off-the-air. Both the majority and the mi-
nority would place the seller of a copying device, technically capable of
noninfringing uses, under a duty measured by why consumers actually
use the device. The breach of the duty occurs upon reaching the re-
quired quantum of proven direct infringement by consumers, which, in
turn, depends upon the quantum of fair use.270 Moreover, Betamax evi-
267 The misuse doctrine may indeed significantly limit the scope of any duty owed not to actively
induce infringement if section 271 (b) is not linked to section 271 (d) of the Patent Act. See discussion
supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
268 See supra text accompanying notes 199-204.
269 See supra text accompanying note 201. Note, however, how the Supreme Court in Ives dealt
with this issue:
However, whether these petitioners were liable for the pharmacists' infringing acts de-
pended upon whether, in fact, the petitioners intentionally induced the pharmacists to mis-
label generic drugs or, in fact, continued to supply cyclandelate to pharmacists whom the
petitioners knew were mislabeling generic drugs. The District Court concluded that Ives
made neither of those factual showings.
Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).
270 When a duty issue arises in tort law it is always tempting to apply the formula Judge Learned
Hand set forth in United States v. Carol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). According to
judge Hand's formula, a duty would arise and liability would be imposed if the burden (B) of taking
adequate precautions to prevent injury was less than the probability (P) of that injury occurring
times the magnitude of that injury (L). In other words, liability would be imposed if B<PL. Id at
173. In terms of this formula, both the majority and the minority in Betamax focused on probability
in their fair use analyses. The majority considered the burden (B) required to prevent injury to be
an injunction, while the dissent was more flexible and would require a "jamming" device in VCR's to
prevent unauthorized copying or the payment of royalties. The injury suffered by copyright owners
would be damages for infringement, which would depend on the quantum of direct infringement not
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dently imposes a general duty on all copyright owners within the subject
class. The duty is not limited to particular copyrights and the seller of
the VCR does not even need reason to know its customers are using the
VCR to infringe that particular copyright. 27'
If the technology has the technical capability of both infringing and
noninfringing uses, the creator of the technology obviously cannot in-
sure that a purchaser will not use it to infringe any more than the seller
of any product can insure it will not be used negligently or criminally by
its purchaser to injure a third party. 272 Thus, the creator subjects itself
to the vicissitudes of users and can only absolutely protect itself by taking
the technology off the market, rendering the technology technically inca-
pable of user abuses, or seeking the authorization of copyright owners
for whatever infringing uses to which the technology may be put.
III. Tensions
Although the developer of the copy technology prevailed in Betamax,
significant tensions were evident in the manner in which both the major-
ity and the dissent analyzed the case. Of the five factors identified as
limiting the scope of protection afforded under the doctrine of contribu-
tory infringement, only the first factor, the standard for direct infringe-
ment, limited the scope of contributory copyright infringement as
applied in Betamax. This limitation came in the form of the fair use ex-
ception to direct infringement, with contributory infringement being de-
termined by the extent to which there is or is not fair use. The other four
factors were not limiting, either because they were not considered or
they were, in the final analysis, irrelevant. 273
privileged by fair use. The Copyright Act gives the copyright owner the option of(1) actual damages
and any additional profits of the infringer or (2) statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1982).
However, as seen in Betamax, with fair use controlling the quantum of direct infringement, this loads
two factors in Judge Hand's formula-probability (P) and also injury (L). Hence, fair use would
appear to control the result, presuming there was agreement on the burden which should be re-
quired of the VCR manufacturer. See also the approach of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS of
balancing the utility of the actors conduct versus the magnitude of the risk of injury to another.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-295 (1965).
271 See infra text accompanying notes 343-44.
272 Tort law has been hesitant to impose a duty on the seller of a non-defective product to protect
third parties from intentional or negligent injury resulting from the use of the product. Liability has
been limited to concerted or inducement theories, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 133-
37, 142-44, 180-85. An "entrustment" theory (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965))
has been frequently applied. The entrustment theory is most frequently applied where the person
who is given access to the product "is a member of a class which is notoriously likely to misuse the
thing which the actor permits him to use." Id. comment b. See also PROSSER, supra note 129, § 33, at
197-203. The refusal of the common law to impose liability on the seller of alcoholic beverages to
intoxicated purchasers for the torts of the latter illustrates the narrow scope of the duty. See W.
PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 345 (7th ed. 1982).
273 The second factor, the contributing conduct and the fault theory, does not significantly limit
the scope of contributory infringement. The contribution is consummated by the sale of an article
that is technically capable of significant noninfringing uses. The fault element is based on negli-
gence, and is satisfied by the constructive knowledge of the seller that its article will be used to a
significant degree by its purchasers to directly infringe copyrights. Moreover, such infringement
would be with reference only to copyrights in general rather than to specific copyrights owned by the
plaintiff. The third factor, misuse, is not even raised, although had the Studios proved significant
direct infringement by the absence of significant fair use, this would have extended the scope of their
copyright protection to the market for VCR's, either in the form of total exclusion or by demanding
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After the Supreme Court decided Betamax, the Studios sought a re-
hearing because the Court relied on findings of fact that were five years
old.2 74 Although the rehearing was denied,2 75 this attempt illustrates
that the contributory infringement issue, even with respect to video re-
cording, may not be dead if copyright owners expend sufficient resources
to overcome any fair use argument by determining why consumers are
using their VCR's. These tensions in Betamax will become more evident
if certain legislative proposals are enacted. So far, technology owners
have been able to stave off the assault of the copyright owners, but the
war begun with Betamax continues. Legislative efforts during the Betamax
litigation, including proposals to impose royalties on the sale of VCR's
and blank video cassette tapes, 276 have not found approval in Congress.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Betamax, the legislative battle
shifted from home video recording to home audio recording, 277 and,
most recently, to digital audio recording, with the development of the
digital audio tape (DAT) system.278
Technological advances are not inherently antithetical to copyrights
and their owners. Depending on the nature of the advance, it may be a
boon or a bane to copyright owners; more often the advancement is a
"mixed blessing." The development of computer systems, including
computer programs essential for the utility of such systems, illustrates
the latter phenomenon. The copyrightability of computer programs has
provided a significant economic incentive to create such programs. 279
royalties for access to that market. In addition, the staple/nonstaple dichotomy is an irrelevant fac-
tor in the sense that it was not the technical capability of the article that determined whether it was a
nonstaple or not but rather whether there was significant direct infringement determined by the
absence of significant fair use. Finally, the scope of protection under contributory infringement in
the Betamax analysis would impose a duty upon VCR manufacturers to protect the right of copyright
owners in general from the unauthorized use of these recorders by their owners. This duty would go
beyond not only intellectual property law principles but also beyond those of general tort law with-
out any articulated justification. See supra note 272.
274 The Studios argued that by basing its decision on five-year-old trial findings the Court would
be "perpetuat[ing] an intolerable injustice" amounting to a "travesty." The Studios emphasized
that the market had dramatically changed, with 10 million VCR's presently being owned compared
to only 800,000 at the time of trial. Moreover, technical advances permitted users of VCR's easily to
skip commercials. Also, prerecorded motion pictures now constituted a major portion of producers'
incomes. Finally, a number of copyright owners of sports and religious programs were no longer
willing to authorize home recording. See 27 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 418-19 (1984)
(summarizing the Studios' brief petitioning for rehearing).
275 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
276 After the Ninth Circuit's decision, Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963
(9th Cir. 1981), bills were introduced to exempt home noncommercial VCR recordings from copy-
right infringement. See S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 4783, 4794, 4808 & 5250, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 5488 & 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Successor bills were
amended to impose a royalty on the sale of VCR's and blank video tapes. See S. 31 & 175, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
277 For a survey of home audio recording bills, see Note, The Home Audio Recording Act: An Inappro-
priate Response to the Home Taping Question, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 435, 442 n.37 (1987). Cf Nimmer,
Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamaxl Myth, 68 VA. L. REv. 1505 (1982).
278 See infra text accompanying notes 287-90.
279 The Copyright Act of 1976 does not expressly include computer programs as one of the cate-
gories of copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). However, the House Report
states: "The term 'literary works' . . . also includes computer data bases and computer programs to
the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as
distinguished from the ideas themselves." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 54 (1976).
Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 was amended in 1980 to include a definition of computer
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The ease with which diskettes may be copied, however, diminishes the
incentive to create new programs.
The development of the compact disc (CD) digital recording and
play back system 280 serves as a prime example of the sometimes symbi-
otic relationship between technology and copyright. In the CD system,
analog (audio frequency) works are converted into digital form and im-
pressed onto a compact disc.28 ' Pre-recorded CD's are played back by a
CD player. The digital recording on the disc is sensed by a laser beam
and then converted into analog form for high quality, audio frequency
reproduction. 28 2 In the few years since its introduction, this system has
provided a significant new market for long-playing musical recordings. 28 3
The compact disc system is ideal for copyright owners because it is a
"playback only" system, as CD players do not have recording
capability. 28 4
Nonetheless, technology does not necessarily advance in a direction
copyright owners find economically desirable. Technology with competi-
tive advantages may significantly diminish the market for copyrighted
works in a given medium or may even eliminate that market.285 For ex-
ample, the VCR has virtually eliminated the market for videodisc players
and will eventually eliminate the market for copyrighted videodiscs. 286
programs. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028. The copyrightability of
computer programs has been sustained in the courts. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v.Jaslow Dental Labo-
ratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Williams Elec. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
280 See generally Compact-Disc Players, 50 CONSUMER REP. 324 (1985) [hereinafter Compact-Disc
Players].
281 Id. at 324-25.
282 Id. at 325.
283 Since being introduced in 1983, the number of CD's sold has increased to over 50 million
discs. Wilson, Behind That Chorus of Sour Notes Over DAT, NAT'LJ., Sept. 12, 1987, at 2298. From
1984 to 1986, the number of CD's sold increased by 47.2 million discs compared to a drop in the
sale of conventional long-playing records of 79.4 million. The Sound of Money, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5,
1987, at 72.
284 A compact disc would fall within the definition of a "phonorecord" under the Copyright Act
of 1976, as amended:
'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later devel-
oped, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'pho-
norecords' includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The copyrightable subject matter would be the "sound recording" fixed on
the compact disc. Id. § 102(a)(7). Copyrightable subject matter may also exist in the underlying
musical works. Id. § 102(a)(2). Included within the exclusive rights in copyrighted works are the
rights "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords" (id. § 106(1)) and "to dis-
tribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease or lending" (id. § 106(3)). See also 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1986) (the anti-rental provision for phonorecords).
285 The examples are numerous, ranging from piano rolls and 78 RPM shellac phonograph
records to 8-track tapes and, most recently, vinyl long playing 33 1/3 RPM records.
286 Sales of videodisc players dropped from approximately 300,000 in 1983 to 200,000 in 1986.
During the same period, retail sales of VCR's increased from 4 million to 13.2 million. Wilson, supra
note 283, at 2298. The market for videodisc players is expected to erode further with the introduc-
tion of so-called "combi players" that are capable of playing back regular 12-inch videodiscs, 5-inch
audio CD's, 3-inch audio singles CD's, and the new compact-disc videos (CD-V's). Winter, The Win-
ter Consumer Electronics Show is Largely a Rerun, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 11, 1988, § 4 (Business), at 2.
These players may prolong the market life for regular videodiscs.
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The recent development of the digital audio tape (DAT) recorder
offers the capability of both recording and playback.28 7 Moreover, the
"sound recording" on compact discs may be recorded in a digital format
on a tape cassette with the resulting cassette recordings having a quality
substantially equivalent to the originally recorded CD's.28 8 Copyright
owners allege that the DAT recorder will eliminate any difference be-
tween originals and copies28 9 and will have a significant negative impact
on the market for CD's, because anyone having access to CD's will be
able to reproduce them by using a DAT recorder. 290
In recognition of the stress the Betamax case created and the
rumblings of copyright owners of CD's, the developers of the DAT sys-
tem evidently convinced themselves that they should sacrifice technical
quality for perceived legal safety. At the urging of Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, the DAT developers agreed to de-
grade the quality of their own recorders291 in an attempt to avoid suits
for contributory infringement. This step also minimized the chances for
legislation imposing restrictions on DAT recorders. 292 The developers
attenuated the quality of DAT technology by making the recorders inca-
287 See generally Feldman, Here Comes DAT, POPULAR Sci., Aug. 1986, at 80; Ranada, Orgins of a
Species, HIGH FIDELITY, Aug. 1987, at 52.
288 Feldman, supra note 287, at 110; Ranada, supra note 287, at 53..
289 As stated by a spokesperson for the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA):
"Why is DAT such a threat? Because it eliminates any distinction between originals and copies.
Because with DAT every copy becomes a new original ... g." Digital Audio Tape Recorders: Hearing on
H.R. 1384 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1987) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement ofJa-
son S. Berman, President, Recording Industry Association of America). Berman made the same
statements before the Senate Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation. See Digital Audio Recorder Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 506 Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13-71 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement ofJason S. Berman, President, Recording
Industry Association of America) Cf Leonard Feldman's statement opposing the bill: "The result is
still a very good recording - slightly better than you can do with some of the best consumer analog
audio recording systems available today - but by no stretch of the imagination a 'perfect master' or
'digital clone.' " House Hearings, supra, at 141 (statement of Leonard Feldman, Owner, Leonard Feld-
man Electronic Laboratories).
290 House Hearings, supra note 289, at 46-47 (statement ofJason S. Berman, President, Recording
Industry Association of America). Owners of both CD players and DAT recorders may, for instance,
borrow CD's from friends or obtain them through clubs or other arrangements; many libraries now
stock CD's. The anti-rental provision of 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986) with respect to pho-
norecords expires October 4, 1989. Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984). However, legislation
has been proposed to extend this provision for five years. See 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 345, 359 (1988).
291 See Burgess, DAT Recorder Sounds Alarm For Industry, Washington Post, Mar. 29, 1987, at HI
(Business); see also House Hearings, supra note 289, at 140-41 (statement of Leonard Feldman, Owner,
Leonard Feldman Electronic Laboratories).
292 Burgess, supra note 291, at H1 ("as a gesture to the critics"). See also Sugimato, Business Today:
Japanese Firms Uncertain on DAT Introduction, United Press Int'l, June 2, 1987 ("a concession to the
record industry"). Jason Berman, on behalf of the music recording industry, has stated that the
industry intends "to sue any manufacturer who tries to bring DAT machines into the U.S. before this
issue is resolved" and that the industry has established a "legal fund for that purpose." See Winter,
U.S. Ruling Eases Way for Digital Tape Players, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 2, 1988, § 3 (Business), at 4, col.
4. See Warren, Digital Audiotapes Future: Now You See It, Now You Don't, Chicago Tribune, May 27,
1988, § 7 (Friday), at 68, col. 4, reporting that the "record association has already amassed a war
chest for suing electronics companies that import DAT players into the U.S." and that the electronic
industries association has responded with a six-figure legal defense fund. Presumably the basis of
such a suit would be contributory copyright infringement.
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pable of direct digital-to-digital recording and playback. 293 In doing so,
the developers prevented the possibility of directly transferring the digi-
tal recording from a CD to the DAT tape. 2 94 Accordingly, under the
present DAT system, the digital encoding on a CD must be converted
first to analog form (i.e., audio frequency) and then to a digital format for
recording on the tape cassette. The technical consequences of having to
go from digital-to-analog-to-digital is that the quality of the recorded
copy on the DAT cassette is said to be three times noisier than the origi-
nal CD. 2 9 5
By so degrading the quality of their recorder design, it is not imme-
diately apparent that DAT producers placed themselves in a better posi-
tion against a claim of contributory infringement as compared to making
a higher quality digital-to-digital DAT. This is the case whether either a
technical capability or a user capability standard for contributory in-
fringement was applied. A digital-to-digital DAT recorder has the same
technical capability for infringing and noninfringing use as does a digital-
analog-digital one. Either version of the recorder will record
noncopyrighted works with the same facility and quality as copyrighted
ones.
With respect to fair use, there would be few CD's not copyrighted as
"sound recordings." There may be, however, some portions which do
not qualify for copyright protection. In addition, some copyright owners
may authorize copying of their CD's. 29 6 Moreover, if fair use may be
sustained for nonproductive time-sharing off-the-air, one would expect
fair use to apply afortiori to CD purchasers who record them, in whole or
in part, at home on their DAT recorders for private use.2 97
In any event, these relatively minor concessions to quality that pre-
vent the DAT recorders from directly recording digital-to-digital from
CD's have not significantly appeased copyright owners of CD's. They
have sought federal legislative protection from copying CD's even in the
technically degraded format. The Digital Audio Recorder Act of 1987
293 House Hearings, supra note 289, at 140 (statement of Leonard Feldman, Owner, Leonard Feld-
man Electronic Laboratories).
294 To prevent direct digital-to-digital recording, the DAT machines employ a different digital
sampling rate for recording and for playback. In addition, a "flag" signal is incorporated in the
recording system which will detect a corresponding code on a CD that would disable the recorder
from direct digital-to-digital recording. Id.
295 Id. at 140-41.
296 Evidently, some CD producers would offer CD's without copy protection at a higher price
than copy-protected CD's, if the DAT bill were enacted. See Morehouse, Digital Tape Recorders Spark
Lobbying 11ar, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1235 (1987).
297 A DAT recorder is, of course, capable of recording works originally recorded on other media,
such as prerecorded analog (audio frequency) tapes and vinyl phonorecords. The only difference
between recording these and CD's is the quality of the original recordings and the need to go
through the additional step of converting the recorded analog material to digital for recording on
the DAT cassette. In the case of pre-recorded digitally recorded cassettes, the quality may be sub-
stantially equivalent to CD's. See House Hearings, supra note 289, at 141 (statement of Leonard Feld-
man, Owner, Leonard Feldman Electronic Laboratories). DAT recorders also provide the technical
advantage that there is no substantial diminution of quality when making copies from copies, with
the digital recording preserving the quality of even an analog original. See House Hearings, supra note
289, at 46 (statement ofJason S. Berman, President of Recording Industry Association of America).
Moreover, owners of DAT recorders may use them to produce their own recordings independent of
any copyrighted materials of others.
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[hereinafter the "DAT Act"] 298 would apply to any "device, now known
or hereafter developed," capable of "making audio recordings in a digi-
tal format," which would include DAT recorders, as well as VCR's in-
cluding devices capable of digital audio recording. 299 The DAT Act
would prohibit the manufacturing and marketing of such devices which
lack an electronic "jamming" circuit, called a "copy-code scanner."300
The "copy-code scanner" would deactivate a digital-recorder from re-
cording any work that had encoded on it a "notch" in frequency, which
the scanner would detect.3 0' Any person aggrieved by a violation of the
above prohibition would have an express cause of action against the
wrongdoer.30 2 Similarly, criminal penalties for the willful violation of
these provisions may be imposed.30 3 In addition, the DAT Act prohibits
any user of such a recorder from bypassing, removing or deactivating a
copy-code scanner.30 4 A user who violates such provision would be sub-
298 S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See also S.
539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3301-3302 (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 3701-3302
(1987); H.R. 1603, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 105 (1987); S. 635, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 132 (1987).
These legislative proposals are substantially similar. One significant difference is that the Adminis-
tration's version (S. 506, H.R. 1384) does not include a 3-year "sunset" provision. See House Hear-
ings, supra note 289, at 9 (statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, Department of Commerce).
299 A "digital audio recording device" is defined as: "[A]ny machine or device, now known or
hereafter developed, which can be used for making audio recordings in a digital format. The term
'digital audio recording device' includes any machine or device which incorporates a digital audio
recording device as part thereof." S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1987). This provision would presumably include the newly announced
Tandy Corp. compact-disc recorder, discussed infra text accompanying notes 336-37.
300 The DAT Act provides:
No person shall manufacture, assemble or offer for sale, resale, lease, or distribution in
commerce (1) any digital audio recording device which does not contain a copy code scan-
ner; or (2) any device, product, or service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to
bypass, remove, or deactivate a copy-code scanner ....
S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1987).
A "copy-code scanner" is defined as:
an electronic circuit or comparable system of circuitry (A) which is built into the recording
mechanism of an audio recording device; (B) which, if removed, bypassed, or deactivated,
would render inoperative the recording capability of the audio recording device; (C) which
continually detects, within the audio frequency range of 3,500 to 4,100 hertz, a notch in an
encoded phonorecord; and (D) which, upon detecting a notch, prevents the audio record-
ing device from recording the sounds embodied in the encoded phonorecord by causing
the recording mechanism of the device to stop recording for at least 25 seconds.
S. 506, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(2) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1987).
301 Such a copy-code system not only could work with CD's but could also work with regular
audio frequency (analog) cassettes as well as video cassettes provided the "copy code scanner" is
included in the recording equipment. The DAT Act is, however, limited to a "digital audio record-
ing device."
302 The civil penalties include injunctions (S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1987); H.R.
1384, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1987)); actual damages and profits of the violator (S. 506,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(l) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(1) (1987)); statu-
tory damages (S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(2) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4(b)(2) (1987)); impounding (S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1987)); and destruction or modification (S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(d)
(1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(d) (1987)).
303 For a knowing and willing violation for financial gain, two years imprisonment and fines of
$50,000 or five times the retail value of the devices sold, whichever is greater, may be imposed. S.
506, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(e) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e) (1987).
304 S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(b) (1987).
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ject to the same civil remedies by an "aggrieved party," but not to crimi-
nal penalties. 30 5
The arguments for and against the DAT Act have been heated and
contradictory. The music recording industry30 6 and its supporters30 7 ar-
gue, inter alia, that the recording industry will lose significant profits with
the introduction of the DAT recorder.308 Protection by the DAT Act is
needed to provide the industry with the incentives to continue to pro-
duce quality music and recordings. 30 9 As Japanese companies primarily
control and produce the DAT technology, the introduction of the DAT
recorder will further exacerbate the foreign trade deficit of the United
States at the expense of the American music industry.3 10
Those on the other side, primarily the home electronics industry31'
and its supporters,31 2 argue that the DAT system will eventually redound
to the benefit of the copyright owners as have other recording sys-
tems. 313 Moreover, they claim record companies are reporting the high-
est profits in history. 314 They also contend that the copyright owners are
"Japan bashing," while having an economic interest in limiting the types
of systems and media available to consumers, so that they can exploit the
CD market without competition from another system.315 Audiophiles, in
particular, strenuously object to the copy-code system as significantly de-
305 S. 506, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4 (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1987). The
criminal penalties apply only to those who manufacture or market such devices, but not to users. S.
506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e) (1987).
306 The industry organization is the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. (RIAA),
whose members represent the producers of 90% of the prerecorded music sold in the United States.
See House Hearings, supra note 289, at 34 (statement ofJason S. Berman, President, Recording Indus-
try Association of America).
307 The supporters included Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, Department of Commerce, on behalf of the Administration; recording artists Em-
mylou Harris and Mary Travers; Victor Fuentealba, President of the American Federation of Musi-
cians; and David Stebbings of CBS Records, which owns the patent and proprietary rights to the
"copy-code scanner."
308 According to House Hearings, supra note 289, at 34 (statement ofJason S. Berman, President,
Recording Industry Association of America), some $1.5 billion annually of sales revenues were dis-
placed by unauthorized copying, amounting to more than one-third of the record industry's total
revenue. As to the alleged dangers of DAT recorders, see id. at 44-48.
309 Berman stated that the amount of new music released had declined more than 40% over the
last eight years. Id. at 36.
310 Id. at 54-57.
311 The electronics industry is represented by the Home Recording Rights Coalition (HRRC),
whose members include enterprises marketing and manufacturing recording equipment and tape,
and various trade organizations. The HRRC was formed after the Ninth Circuit decision in the
Betantax case. See House Hearings, supra note 289, at 90 (statement of Charles D. Ferris, Counsel,
Home Recording Rights Coalition).
312 Those who joined in opposition to the DAT Act at the Hearings included those interested in
the quality of recordings, such as Leonard Feldman, editor of AUDIO magazine and technical editor
of VIDEo REVIEW magazine; and Alec Bernstein, a composer, musician, and designer of digital music
equipment for composers and musicians. Recording artist Stevie Wonder filed a statement opposing
the Act because DAT technology would let young musicians make professional-sounding recordings.
See The Sound of Money, supra note 283, at 73. See also House Hearings, supra note 289, at 130-32 (state-
ment of Charles D. Ferris, Counsel, Home Recording Rights Coalition) for a review of newspaper
and magazine editorials and articles opposing the Act.
313 See House Hearings, supra note 289, at 92-93 (statement of Charles D. Ferris, Counsel, Home
Recording Rights Coalition).
314 See id. at 87, 93.
315 Id. at 94.
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grading the quality of the sound reproduction of the original recording,
particularly with respect to certain types of music. 316
Ironically the so-called "technological fix" to the "home recording
problem" may have hoisted itself on its own technological petard. The
National Bureau of Standards has determined that the "copy-code" sys-
tem causes a discernible dimunition in the sound quality of the copied
work and, moreover, could easily be bypassed.3 17 Another irony is the
acquisition by Sony of CBS Records, which owns the proprietary rights
to the "copy-code" system.318 The DAT Act conditions the requirement
for the inclusion of the jamming device on the availability of a royalty-
free license to use those rights. 31 9 One may speculate whether Sony, as a
potential principal manufacturer of DAT recorders, would find it in its
best interests to make those rights available.3 20 These factors may doom
the DAT Act, but one may anticipate that it will not be long before a new
"technological fix" to the "home recording problem" is advanced.3 2'
Whatever the ultimate fate of the DAT Act or similar legislation, the
enactment of such legislation certainly will not resolve a quite significant
problem faced by copyright owners in the audio and visual recording
fields, namely that of counterfeiting.3 22 Moreover, as most protective de-
vices can be overcome, it is probable that the jamming device can and
316 See House Hearings, supra note 289, at 159 (statement of Alec Bernstein, Aesthetic Research
Company); House Hearings, supra note 289, at 135-36, 143-48 (statement of Leonard Feldman,
Owner, Leonard Feldman Electronic Laboratories); Interrupted Velody, HIGH FIDELITY, July 1987, at
44.
317 Both the House and Senate Subcommittees referred the technical question of whether the
CBS copy-code scanner system distorts music to the National Bureau of Standards for testing. See
Morehouse, supra note 296, at 1235. The House Subcommittee, fearing delays in testings, amended
H.R. 1384 to exempt equipment from the Act if the Commerce Department determines:
(1) that the copy-code scanner system causes audible degradation of sound quality in pre-
recorded music or may be so easily bypassed that it renders the system ineffective; (2) that
an alternative technology has been implemented by DAT manufacturers that is at least as
protective as copy-code scanners; or (3) that an agreement has been entered into which
adequately ensures protection against copying.
34 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 352 (1987). The sunset provision was, moreover, reduced
to one year. Id. On March 1, 1988, the National Bureau of Standards announced its findings. See
Winter, supra note 292.
318 Winter, Tide of Battle Turns for Digital Recorder, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 17, 1988, § 7 (Business),
at 4, col. 2.
319 S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1987); H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1987).
320 See CBS Records: If You Can't Beat 'Em, Sell, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 1987, at 53. Cf., however, the
statement of a Sony spokesperson: "The acquisition will have no effect because the management of
CBS Records will stay in place, and continue to operate with a high degree of independence.... We
do not plan to change their minds." Winter, supra note 318, at 4, cols. 2-3.
321 Sony has confirmed that it is having high level discussions with N.V. Phillips and other Japa-
nese manufacturers with regard to a new type of "jamming" device called "Unicopy" or "Solocopy,"
which would permit the copying of an original CD but would block the copying of the tape copy.
Winter, supra note 318. This would resolve the problem brought up by Berman on behalf of the
music recording industry of the proliferation of high-grade copies of copies. See supra note 297. See
also House Hearings, supra note 289, at 8 (statement ofDonaldJ. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Com-
missioner of Patents and Trademarks, Department of Commerce).
322 It has been estimated that counterfeit audio records and tapes have resulted in total lost sales
of $812 million in 1980 and $658 million in 1982. U.S. INr'L TRADE COMM'N, FOREIGN PRODUCT
COUNTERFEITING 49 (1984). It has also been estimated that up to 25% ofrecords and tapes in retail
stores in the United States may be counterfeit. Id. at 47.
1989]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
would be circumvented by consumers. 323 Consumers could easily con-
vert a DAT recorder to a higher quality digital-to-digital recording de-
vice.324 As the spokesman for the home recording lobby stated,
"recorders gotta' record."325
The question arises whether supplying a device for defeating a jam-
ming device in a digital recording system would constitute contributory
infringement by its supplier. An analogous question was raised in a re-
cent copyright case, Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd. ,326 involving a
"copy-protected" computer diskette and an "unlock" program for copy-
ing such a diskette. Plaintiff sold a copy-protected diskette to software
producers. The diskettes had recorded on them a copy-inhibiting pro-
gram (PROLOCK), which was copyrighted by plaintiff. The software
producer would record its copyrighted programs onto the copy-pro-
tected diskettes and then market them. Defendant marketed a program
(CopyWrite) that was designed to "unlock" the copy-protected diskette
by means of a program called RAMKEY and then to copy it.327 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief on a number of
grounds, 328 including that there was no contributory infringement be-
cause the defendant's RAMKEY program was capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.329 The district court had found that these uses included
not only making functional archival copies of copy-protected diskettes
323 The DAT Act provides for civil remedies against users defeating the copy-code scanner. See
supra note 302. However, enforcement becomes virtually impossible against individual users.
324 See House Hearings, supra note 289, at 44-45 n.6 (statement of Jason S. Berman, President,
Recording Industry Association of America) (stating that a "black box" to permit digital-to-digital
recording probably would cost less than $50.00).
325 The entire quote of Mr. Ferris is: "Fish gotta' swim, birds gotta' fly, and recorders gotta'
record." House Hearings, supra note 289, at 96 (statement of Charles D. Ferris, Counsel, Home Re-
cording Rights Coalition). Presumably, Mr. Ferris is fully aware of the fair use defense in paraphras-
ing the words from "Can't Help Loving That Man," lyrics by Oscar Hammerstein II, music by
Jerome Kern. See A. LAUFE, BROADWAY'S GREATEST MUSICALS 23, 25 (1973).
326 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
327 Id. at 257.
328 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987). Plaintiff's claim that
defendant directly infringed its copyright by loading it into a computer was dismissed on the ground
that section 117 of the Copyright Act exempted copies "created as an essential step in the utilization
of the computer program." 847 F.2d at 261. Note, however, that section 117, as an exception to the
exclusive rights of section 106, is limited to "the owner of a copy of a computer program." Copy-
right Act, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). Defendant was not an "owner" but a mere licensee of plaintiff's
program, having acquired it under a "shrink-wrap" licensing agreement. Id. at 257. The court
equated, without discussion, "owners" with "rightful possessors," which was in the "CONTU Re-
port" (NAT'L COMM'N OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT (July 31, 1978)), upon which section
117 is based. The only change made by Congress from the CONTU language was to change "right-
ful possessors" to "owners." See 847 F.2d at 260 n. 11. Second, the court of appeals reversed the
district court's holding that plaintiff did have standing to bring a contributory infringement claim
because it was plaintiff's customers whose programs were being copied from plaintiff's copy-pro-
tected disks. The court of appeals found standing in the fact that the plaintiff's PROLOCK program
was also copied. Id. at 262-63. Third, defendant's "unlock" program was held not to be a "deriva-
tive work" under section 102(2) of the Copyright Act. Id. at 267-68. Finally, the court also held the
Lousiana Software Licensee Enforcement Act (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1961-66 (West 1987)) was
preempted by the Copyright Act, in particular as being contrary to section 117. The Louisiana Act
permitted prohibiting the making of any unauthorized copies and "reverse engineering" of pro-
grams. Id. at 268-70.
329 847 F.2d at 263-67.
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but also for making copies of unprotected software and analyzing new
software. 330
In limiting the district court's finding, the court of appeals indicated
that the fact that CopyWrite could be used to make copies of unprotected
diskettes and as a diagnostic tool for new programs was irrelevant to the
issue of whether RAMKEY had substantial noninfringing uses.33 1 The
analysis should be centered only on the technical capability of that por-
tion of defendant's software used to "unlock" plaintiff's program. This
important distinction was recognized in Betamax, where the Studios did
not object to the sale of VCR's without tuners for receiving off-the-air
programs. Justice Blackman observed: "In considering the noninfring-
ing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses that would remain possi-
ble without Betamax's built-in tuner should not be taken into
account." 332
In any event, the difficulty of policing against the distribution of
"unlock" devices is well illustrated by the widespread availability of
"black boxes" for decoding "subscriber" broadcasts via cable and satel-
lite, as well as copy protected recordings.33 3 The futility of copy protect-
ing devices is graphically brought home by Judge Ferguson's simile
during the trial of the Betamax case in response to the suggestion that a
"jamming" device be placed in VCR's:
[A]s sure as you and I are sitting in this courtroom today, some bright
young entrepreneur, unconnected with Sony, is going to come up with
a device to unjam the jam ... [a]nd then we have a device to jam the
unjamming of the jam, and we all end up like jelly.33 4
Experience suggests that any tensions between copyright and tech-
nology must be resolved in the marketplace. The market successfully re-
solved the matter with respect to VCR's. Producers of motion pictures
now derive more revenue from after-market sales and rental of copy-
righted works on video cassette than from the prime-market of ticket
330 655 F. Supp. at 759.
331 847 F.2d at 264 n. 16. A different question could arise if the "unlocking" and "copy making"
capabilities of the program were inextricably intertwined, such that one could not be performed
without the other. It was admitted here that CopyWrite would have no commercial value without
RAMKEY. Id.
332 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 492 n.42 (1984).
333 E.g., a recent newspaper advertisement offered the described device for $99.95: "The new
Play-Right eliminates changes in brightness, color flashing, loss of color, picture rolls and jittering
when playing back copy protected movies. Its digital processor removes all unwanted information,
then generates a new 'clean' signal." Chicago Tribune, Dec. 14, 1987, § 4 (Business), at 4. The
following disclaimer was given: "WARNING! This device is not to be used for the unauthorized
duplication of copyrighted material, which is prohibited by federal copyright law." Id See also
Means, Cable-TJ" Descrambling, RADIO-ELECTRONICS, Feb. 1984, at 48, providing detailed information
on building a Cable TV descrambler. See also advertisement, RADIO-ELECTRONiCS, Apr. 1986, at 115,
stating: "We stock the exact parts, PC board and AC adaptor for Radio Electronics 1984 article on
building your own Cable TV Descrambler." Cf Cooper, Satellite TV, RADio-ELEcTRONiCS, June
1986, at 75, 76, who states that he has not yet seen any "gadget or circuit that will recover both
scrambled video or scrambled audio" from satellite transmissions, but concludes the article with:
"Who knows you may be the first to break the digital audio scrambling system that is the current
rage in commercial telecommunications!" Id.
334 Quoted in Lardner I, supra note 4, at 62-63.
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sales for first run performances.335 The market may also resolve the con-
troversy over the DAT recorder. Recently, Tandy Corporation an-
nounced the development of a compact disc system that will record as
well as play back CD's. The system, as announced, will produce CD-
quality digital recordings and sell for under $500 and will be on the mar-
ket by late 1989 or early 1990.336 The new Tandy CD-recorder/playback
system will pose a serious competitive threat to DAT recorders and a
serious economic threat to the music recording industry.33 7 The latter is
likely to pursue its lobbying efforts before Congress to restrain or impose
royalties on such recording systems.
In terms of the dual goals of the patent/copyright clause of the Con-
stitution, it seems somewhat anomalous to provide increased incentives
to produce one form of intellectual property at the expense of another.
One should expect that the free market system would enable both forms
to coexist and provide adequate incentives for their efficient coexistence.
It is unclear what impact the DAT Act would have on the incentive for
creating or recording musical works.338 On the other hand, digital re-
corders, such as the DAT and Tandy systems, would provide significant
technological advantages beyond their use for recording CD's. 33 9 One
important advantage is to provide composers and musicians with excep-
tionally high quality recording equipment for use in their homes or stu-
dios.340 If the DAT bill is enacted, however, the desirability of and,
hence, the market for such recorders may significantly drop, thus elimi-
nating economies of scale and keeping the price of digital recorders at a
335 See The Sound of Money, supra note 283, at 73.
336 See Duke & Blumenthal, Tandy Planning a CD Recorder Priced at $500, Wall St.J., Apr. 22, 1988,
§ 2, at 36 [hereinafter Tandy Planning]; Duke & Blumenthal, CD Recorder Poses Upset for Industry, Wall
St. J., Apr. 26, 1988, § 1, at 6. DAT recorders have been priced at $1000 and up. Tandy Planning,
supra, at col. 2. See also Winter, Uncertainty, Potential Rival Keeping DAT Players Out of U.S., Chicago
Tribune, May 29, 1988, § 7 (Business), at 4 (reporting industry uncertainty over the potential impact
of the Tandy system on DAT recorders).
337 Tandy Planning, supra note 336.
338 As stated by officials of the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress: "Setting aside
the legal question of whether the copyright law does prohibit home recording, that home recording
causes producers significant harm by displacing sales has so far not been demonstrated. There are
no reliable estimates of the extent of lost revenues caused by home recording." Senate Hearings, supra
note 289, at 99 (statement of Fred W. Weingarten and Linda Garcia, Office of Technology Assess-
ment). Cf House Hearings, supra note 289, at 13 (statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary
and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Department of Commerce): "The Administration is
convinced that the widespread importation of machines that encourage the unauthorized reproduc-
tion of copyrighted sound recordings will result in lost sales, thus, impairing this industry's competi-
tive posture and reducing the incentives to songwriters and producers provided by the copyright
law."
339 Ferris lists these uses as:
- Demonstration tapes by bands that can't afford professional studios.
- Home music pi-actice.
- Composition and performance, electronically or otherwise, involving over-dubbing.
- Use with personal computers and for other data storage - a 120 minute DAT tape
holds almost I gigabyte of information.
- Recording video information - already, a prototype video camcorder has been shown,
using DAT tape cassettes.
Senate Hearings, supra note 289, at 41 (statement of Charles D. Ferris, Counsel, Home Recording
Rights Coalition) (emphasis in original).
340 See id. at 73-79 (statement of Alec Bernstein, Aesthetic Research Co.).
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relatively high level.341 In addition, in the case of DAT recorders, in a
limited market there is little likelihood that a significant quantity of pre-
recorded digital tape cassettes will be marketed. 342
If every new development in audio, visual or copying technology
must degrade the quality and the availability of such technology, then
significant disincentives would be imposed on particular segments of
technology, including financiers, developers, distributors and consumers
of technology.343 On the other hand, the dual constitutional goals can-
not be achieved by significantly diminishing the incentives for the crea-
tion of copyrightable works by permitting unrestricted copying. Nor
would these goals be advanced by imposing an unduly narrow standard
of contributory infringement that would redound to the benefit of the
producers of copy technology, whose sole significant purpose was to en-
able users to record copyrighted works.
It is suggested that the proper balance between the interests of copy-
right and copy technology owners may be provided by the technical capa-
bility standard for contributory infringement. Under this standard, the
sale of copy technology that has only the technical capability to infringe
and no significant noninfringing capability would constitute contributory
infringement. With this standard, it is unnecessary to impose the knowl-
edge requirement of patent law that the seller of the nonstaple have ac-
tual knowledge of the particular patent to be infringed with the
nonstaple.
There are a number of reasons for not imposing an actual knowl-
edge standard in copyright law. First, it would be virtually impossible for
an owner of a copyright fixed in a particular medium to prove that a
seller of copy technology would know that a purchaser of its technology
would use it to record that specific copyrighted work. Second, while a
patent owner can easily place the seller of a nonstaple on notice that the
sale of such a nonstaple infringes its patent, a copyright owner can, at
best, give general notice that the copy technology can be used to infringe
its particular copyrights. Third, the technical capability standard is self-
limiting and requires only a constructive knowledge requirement of the
producers of technology that has no purpose but to permit infringement
of copyrights in a particular medium. This would not seem to diminish
the incentive for the invention of copying technology having other signif-
icant technical capabilities beyond copyright infringement.
341 When introduced in 1976, a Betamax deck sold for $1300. See Lardner I, supra note 4, at 45.
Today VCR's may be purchased for under $200. When the first CD players were introduced by Sony
in 1983, they sold for $900. See Compact-Disc Players, supra note 280, at 324. Today CD players may
be purchased for under $100.
342 One of the arguments raised by the music industry lobby was that because of the unavailability
of prerecorded digital tapes and the equipment for high speed production of such tapes, purchasers
of DAT recorders would primarily use them to copy CD's. See Senate Hearings, supra note 289, at 16-
19 (statement ofJason S. Berman, President, Recording Industry Association of America). However,
it was announced in September 1987, that Sony had introduced a high speed duplication system for
the reproduction of pre-recorded digital cassettes. Kristof, Slow Start for New Japanese Recorder, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at D9, col. 4.
343 The retail value of VCR's shipped in 1984 amounted to $3.4 billion; portable tape equipment
alone amounted to another $1.3 billion. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABsTrAcr OF THE UNrrED STATES 215 (107th ed. 1987).
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In sum, a technical capability standard based upon constructive
knowledge of copyright infringement in a particular medium could im-
plement the free competition policy underlying this standard in patent
law preventing the extension of the monopoly to staples having nonin-
fringing capabilities. In addition, the advantage of an objective determi-
nation of technical capability is that it replaces the vagaries of the
"troublesome" doctrine of fair use without a significant unbalancing of
incentives between copyright and technology.
One means of examining whether the dual constitutional goals are
being promoted by this suggested standard is to focus on the market cre-
ated by the technology and on whether an adequate incentive is provided
for copyright owners to share in that market. For example, providing
copyright owners a form of exclusive control of the market or partial con-
trol through fees or royalties is one such incentive.
The invention of the VCR created not only a new market in time-
shifting for recording off-the-air copyrighted works, but also a market for
the sale and rental of prerecorded video tapes.344 Similarly, the inven-
tion of the DAT recorder created a new market for prerecorded cassette
tapes in the digital format.345 Copyright owners are the beneficiaries346
of these new markets by having new media for the distribution of their
copyrighted works. Whether prerecorded digital cassette tapes will be
able to compete effectively with CD's will depend upon the market. Any
loss of sales of CD's resulting from DAT recorders being used to copy
them may be made up by the sale of prerecorded DAT cassettes. It is
unclear that there will be less incentive to create and market musical
works by having only one medium, as compared to having two or more
competing, or perhaps more aptly, complementary media. 347 Any loss of
revenue by the decline in the market for CD's may be compensated by
the newly created market for prerecorded digital tapes, provided that
DAT recorders and cassettes are available at competitive prices with CD
players and CD's. The introduction of the Tandy CD-recorder may have
a significant impact on the market for DAT recorders and digital tapes
and may provide an increased market for CD's. Such a solution provides
dual incentives for creators both of technology and copyrights who may
each share in the newly created market.
On the other hand, if technology is created solely for infringing
copyrights, the copyrights may themselves have created the incentive for
that technology rather than any constitutional incentives for technology.
344 The sale and rental market is reported to provide greater revenue than the theatre market for
motion pictures. See The Sound of Money, supra note 283, at 73.
345 With the introduction of high speed duplicating equipment, see supra note 342, it may be
anticipated that a wide variety of digital cassette tapes will become available at competitive prices, at
least with CD's if not with conventional audio tapes.
346 These beneficiaries would include not only the owners of the copyrights on the "motion pic-
tures" or "sound recordings" but also the owners of the underlying works (screen plays, musical
compositions) and the performing artists, directly or indirectly.
347 Audiophiles are well known to purchase sound recordings in more than one media, e.g., vinyl
long play records, audio cassette tapes, and CD's.
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The incentive would be to exploit the market for copyright infringement
rather than to promote the "useful Arts."3 48
In sum, the technical capability standard for contributory infringe-
ment establishes a fair, workable, and tension-relieving balance between
the sometimes competing interests of copyright and technology creators.
Such a standard is more efficient than attempting to strike the balance
between copyright and technology on the basis of the fair use doctrine
and the vagaries of why consumers might use copy technology capable of
noninfringing uses. Moreover, a technical capability standard avoids the
anticompetitive consequences of legislating the debilitation of technol-
ogy, which effectively prevents the new technology from competing
against existing technology and media of fixation for copyrighted works.
If public policy should demand the creation of further incentives to
insure the continued production of audio, visual or other copyrighted
works, incentives other than the degradation of technology could be con-
sidered. These may include prizes, awards, commissions, subsidies of
various forms (e.g., tax incentives), which could be incentives awarded
directly to "authors" who actually create the copyrightable works.3 49
IV. Conclusion
If the tort of contributory infringement depends upon the quantum
of direct infringement as determined by the admittedly "troublesome"
doctrine of fair use, copying technology creators are placed under a duty
to protect copyright owners against infringement by consumers of the
copying technology. The result is an inverse relationship between fair
use and contributory infringement: broader fair use narrows the scope
of contributory infringement, and, conversely, narrower fair use broad-
ens contributory infringement. The majority in Betamax waffled, perhaps
348 See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 755 (E.D. La. 1987), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 326-3 1. In Vault Corp., a "segment" of defendant's "Copyright" pro-
gram called "RAMKEY" had no other purpose but to unlock plaintiff's "PROLOC" program so that
the protected diskette containing copyrighted programs could be copied. The incentive to produce
the "RAMKEY" program defeated the copy protection provided by plaintiff's copyrighted
"PROLOC" program. It is not clear whether the device described in the advertisement quoted supra
note 333 has a technical capability beyond defeating the copy protection on copyrighted films. If a
Betamax fair use analysis is used, attention would presumably be focused on the quantity of consumer
use of this device for time-shifting versus librarying.
349 The "works made for hire" doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976 suggests a "labor" theory
of remuneration for the creation of copyrightable works:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). One may question whether the framers of U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8
had this definition of "author" in mind. In socialist countries, where the means of producing copy-
rightable works resides essentially in the State, a "labor" theory appears to be followed. See Loeber,
"Socialist"Features of Soviet Copyright Law, 23 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L., 297, 305 (1985) (Royalties are
paid to an "author" (free lance) in the form of "deferred wages to be received over the period of
protection." (quotingJ. HAZARD, MANAGING CHANGE IN THE USSR 116 (1953)). The "royalty" must
fall within minimum and maximum rates set by governmental organ decrees and which may vary
according to the subject matter of the work. See Loeber, supra, at 307-08.
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to hold a majority,350 on whether it was adopting a technical capability
standard by applying a user capability standard and entering into a fair
use analysis. The superficiality of the majority's fair use analysis is attrib-
utable to its unarticulated premise that it had adopted a technical capa-
bility standard and was merely using fair use to demonstrate that even
the dissent's user capability standard would not result in a finding of con-
tributory infringement. Yet, one would expect such a premise to be
clearly made. In addressing this shortcoming of the majority's approach,
Justice Blackmun stated: "The Court today is far less positive." '35 '
There is no equivocation by the four dissenting Justices, who would
adopt and apply the user capability standard and rely on fair use to deter-
mine the scope of contributory infringement. Focusing on user capabil-
ity rather than technical capability raises the distinct possibility that, if
the Studios had successfully convinced the district court that the primary
purpose for copying off-the-air programs was unfair use, then contribu-
tory infringement would have been sustained and would be reviewable
only on a "clearly erroneous" standard.3 52
Even though the technology developers prevailed in Betamax, the un-
certainties created by the treatment of contributory infringement fur-
thers the tensions between such developers and copyright owners who
are subject to such technology. In addition, the "quasi-property" solu-
tions suggested by Justice Blackmun as alternative remedies to an injunc-
tion for contributory infringement, such as degrading the technology to
prevent the copying and the imposition of royalties or fees, have inspired
legislative efforts further exacerbating the tensions. The threat of con-
tributory infringement suits and legislation has been successful so far in
delaying the introduction of DAT recorders into the United States.3 5 3
Any solution that involves debilitating, technically or economically,
one form of intellectual property for the benefit of another may well be
incompatible with the constitutional mandate for Congress to promote
both "Science" [in the form of copyrightable works] and the "useful
Arts" [in the form of patentable technology]. These two goals may be
advanced by the "staple article of commerce" doctrine, provided that
such determination is made on the basis of its technical capability, rather
than why it is so used. In the absence of a finding that a product has no
350 The difficulty of forming a majority may be evidenced by the fact the case was first argued on
January 18, 1983, and then set down for reargument: "[S]ince we had not completed our study of
the case last Term." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). Also as
reported by Lardner: "Supreme Court experts were quick to note that Blackmun's unusually long
dissent opened with an elaborate recitation of the facts of the case, and 'bore all the earmarks of
having been drafted originally as a majority opinion,' as Jim Mann put it in the Los Angeles Times."
Lardner II, supra note 4, at 74.
351 Betamax, 464 U.S. at 490. Immediately preceding this sentence, Justice Blackmun stated that
the district court had accepted Sony's argument and held that the "seller of a product used to in-
fringe is absolved from liability whenever the product can be put to any substantial noninfringing
use." Id. This is the technical capability standard as used herein.
352 See Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982), where the Court applied
the "clearly erroneous" standard itself with respect to the contributory infringement issue under
§ 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, when the Court of Appeals failed to do so, and
remanded the § 43(a) issue for review on that standard. 456 U.S. at 856-57.
353 See Winter, supra note 318, at 1, col. 3-5, and Winter, supra note 336, at 4, col. 1-5, reporting
the caution of the Japanese manufacturers in importing DAT recorders into the United States.
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use but to infringe intellectual property, the market should decide on the
basis of free competition which form of technology and the media for
fixing copyrightable works will ultimately prevail. If further incentives
are needed to promote the creation of copyrightable works, alternative
incentives should be considered that do not have the propensity for cre-
ating tensions with technology.35 4
In retrospect, given the unprecedented scope of protection sought
by the copyright owners in Betamax, the wisdom of Justice Holmes, as
shared by Justice Cardozo, might be recalled to advantage: "The law
does not spread its protection so far."'3 55 Caution may also be the order
of the day that one of the sequelae of Betamax is not to extend protection
so far that "Science" and the "useful Arts" are set in opposition to one
another.
354 These incentives need not be limited to federal ones but could also include state incentives,
within the limits of federal preemption. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), which
held that a California statute protecting against the piracy of phonograph records was not pre-
empted by the Copyright Act of 1909, which did not protect "sound recordings" prior to the 1971
amendment. The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, continues the protection of "sound record-
ings." 17 U.S.C. § 1 02(a)(7) (1982). Section 301(a) now preempts from state protection "all legal
and equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified in section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103."
17 U.S.C. § 301(a)(1982). Nonetheless, this would not preclude a state or other governmental unit
from providing incentives in the form of money grants or otherwise for the creation of works that
might qualify for copyright protection.
355 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927) (Holmes, J.).; H.R. Mock Co. v.
Renseelaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 165, 159 N.E. 896, 897 (1928) (Cardozo, J., quoting Robins).
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